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Preface 
 
This doctoral thesis is born as a response to a challenge posed in my 
previous company, Abengoa Research, in which I was definitely decided to prove 
the valuation of Research and Development (R&D) Projects should be assessed 
with Real Option Valuation (ROV) and not with the well-know and widely spread 
Net Present Value (NPV).  
Before reaching there, I have an Engineering background and experience. 
However, in 2010 I decided to start a MBA in Copenhagen finding Corporate 
Finance is my passion. The feel of quantifying money, time and even actions was 
a complete new area of curiosity and investigation.  
After joining Abengoa Research in 2014, I proposed to Manuel Doblaré, 
CEO of such company, to undertake this doctoral thesis to prove the company 
we should think out of the box when assessing R&D. It has taken me about three 
years and a half to do all the investigation, set my new mindset, prepare articles, 
have enriching discussions with my tutors, many and many hours of English 
editing and great doses of patience to wait journals’ response.  
Finally, I am here today to present my doctoral thesis as my last 
contribution to R&D. I have joined a Yieldco company in which I have 





I would like to thank my tutors their availability and flexibility to change 
their initial mindset to a new paradigm in the Engineering.  
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Chapter I. Introduction 
 
Technically, the RO method is more appropriate for valuation of R&D projects 
than DCF, because plans are options, not assets 
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For many decades, Net Present Value (NPV) has been the main tool used by 
companies to assess the future economic revenues of projects and their 
consequently attractiveness. To some extent, this tool made sense as projects 
seemed to be predictable: for instance, a shoe factory would produce shoes, at 
a higher or lower yield, with some uncertainty on inputs’ price or demand, but 
the factory itself would be easy to model. If some hypotheses are met, such as 
the input total cost below or the demand above a certain threshold, the factory 
would work. No more decisions are relevant and NPV perfectly catches the 
rationale of the economics underlying this project.  
As NPV usage became extensive, it was extrapolated to less predictable project 
returns in which the economic rationale would not apply. In these cases, an error 
was introduced into the valuation allowing companies to make not-optimal 
decisions. One of the most representative cases of this idea are the Research 
and Development (R&D) projects. Contrary to the shoe factory case, a R&D 
project presents many options the company can take during the lifetime of the 
investment. By nature of these R&D projects, the initial investment is decided 
many years in advance the demand is forecasted or even if the technical success 
of the project is proven. During the development of the technology or product, 
additional information is usually gathered from market perspectives and 
potential future suppliers or customers. However, there is an increasing risk in 
parallel of another company launching to the market a better technology or 
product, becoming the initial investment less attractive, useless or even 
obsolete.  
Therefore, R&D projects present the so-called flexibility by which managers (ie. 
the company) can decide either to continue the investment as planned, to cancel 
the project, to slow-down the pace of investment to get more information about 
the market demand or even to speed up the process to reach the market before 
a competitor does. However, none of these options can be included into a NPV 
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project valuation. Although NPV is beloved by financial executives, it presents 
the following flaws: 
NPV only accounts for market risk (ie. demand) and “simulates” private risk (ie. 
technical success) by adding subjective probabilities to the different scenarios. 
NPV always assumes the same discount rate for all the life of the project; 
whereas as the investment grows, the technical uncertainty should decrease. 
Based on the risk principle, as the downside risk increases, the upside potential 
also increases. But if the discount rate is increased, the upside potential is 
ignored even more. This inherent bias may result in rejection of potentially 
highly successful projects because of their higher uncertainty.  
Finally, the additional value created because of contingent actions is not 
captured.  
Then, NPV systematically underestimate the value of R&D projects.  
On the other hand, a financial option is the right but not the obligation to trade 
products at a specific time for a predetermined price. These products are 
contracts between two parties, typically consumers and sellers. Real Options 
(RO) is the extension of that financial theory but for real assets assessments. 
Therefore, a RO can be defined as the right but not the obligation to make an 
investment decision concerning real assets, for instance defer its development, 
build a prototype, abandon the project, alter its scale, switch to another 
technology, etc. These possible actions are known as managerial flexibility, and 
it enhances the value of the projects. 
Despite the previous clearly disadvantages, NPV is still widely spread because is 
more intuitive and easier to expand. To some extent, RO seem a black box to 
those executives with lower mathematical background. Nonetheless, after 1994, 
RO were simplified to reach a wider audience. Actually, the evolution of financial 
options began in the early 70s due to growing dissatisfaction with discounted 
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cash flow (DCF) methods at the same time significant breakthroughs in options 
theory were developed by Fisher Black, Myron Scholes and Robert Merton who 
were the first to price their value. Later on, Cox introduced the pricing formula 
for binomial trees. Decision trees only capture the substantial value of the option 
to abandon; however, RO captures the value from the management of market 
risk (risk that cannot be diversified) who adapt the project to the market 
circumstances. However, other approaches have been taken for getting the 
valuation of RO. For instance, Amran and Kulatilaka use partial differential 
equations to express mathematically the value of an option and its dynamics. 
Finally, another approach is to simulate the uncertainty with Monte-Carlo. One 
of the main critics towards RO is their supposed exaggerated value of projects. 
Although the real problem is that NPV is undervaluing those projects because 
its ignores the managerial flexibility, which reduce losses and maximize benefits. 
In summary, the traditional technique of NPV presents several important 
limitations to value R&D projects, such as the use of a static risk-adjusted 
discount rate, the underestimation of the impact of economic uncertainty 
(Borissiouk & Peli 2001), and the failure to consider the value of the flexibility. In 
this respect, the Real Option Analysis (ROA) allows us to overcome these 
limitations, particularly when the uncertainty conditions that characterise the 
current context are considered (Zhang et al. 2014) because the ROA values the 
flexibility which implies that managers can readjust their R&D projects in the 
face of the potential impact of both external and internal factors (Borissiouk & 
Peli 2001; Santos et al. 2014). 
This doctoral thesis deeply explores these considerations and limitations of NPV 
presenting a R&D project valuation in the specific case of Concentrated Solar 
Power. By using Real Option Valuation (ROV), two perspectives are provided of: 
the private company and the public institution. 
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As regards the private company perspective, the use of renewable energy for 
electricity generation has been assessed as beneficial throughout the cycle of 
high and low oil prices (Krozer 2013). According to Krozer, the growing 
renewable energy use has not increased consumers’ electricity prices except in 
the countries that hardly used it and it had a calming effect on the prices in the 
countries that are large renewable energy users. Therefore, although 
uncompetitive during low oil prices, the use of renewable energy is attractive 
during high fossil fuel prices. An anti-cycling policy that anticipates high fossil 
fuel prices through enforcement and support of renewable energy during low 
prices is socially beneficial.  
The subsequent issue would be to determine if public R&D financing is 
complementary to private R&D spending or it becomes a substitute which tends 
to crowd it out. Currently, there are some policies like feed-in tariff (FiT), 
renewable portfolio standard (RPS), tax rebates and direct subsidies or grants 
directly given to companies to promote R&D investment. The use of grants to 
encourage private R&D financing has been already discussed in previous works 
(David et al. 2000), with the positive conclusion that it amplifies the effect of 
private R&D rather than crowding it out (Ali-Yrkkö 2004). Results confirm that 
the public funding of R&D expenditure through subsidies have a positive impact 
on the decision to conduct R&D internally (Afcha et al. 2014). Moreover, some 
results establish that receiving a positive decision to obtain public R&D funds 
increases privately financed R&D. Ali-Yrkkö (Ali-Yrkkö 2004) suggests that this 
additionally effect is bigger in large firms rather than in small firms. 
Furthermore, some scholars have already investigated the optimality of the 
modulation of public R&D financing (Marino et al. 2010) to strike a balance 
between crowding-in effects and crowding-out effects that typically plague 
public policies. Policy makers are assigned the tasks of the modulation of public 
intervention. From the point of view of those policy makers, there is literature 
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and work providing tools and evidences to serve the needs of the energy 
policymaking community (Siddiqui et al. 2007). The perspective of policy makers 
and funding agencies (Eckhause et al. 2014) has been already taken into account 
to determine the optimal funding strategy in several R&D areas. However, there 
is a lack in the literature from the point of view of private companies to 
determine if a grant will have a positive impact or, on the other hand, could be 
even not beneficial for the firm.  
It seems clear that if a public R&D policy replaces private investment, the policy 
is not appropriate. On the other hand, as well as there is an upper limit that 
should not be exceeded by the policy makers, there might be a lower limit that 
companies should not accept, because in most of the cases these direct 
subsidies restrict management choices to defer, abandon or modify the scale or 
technology of the project. Real Options Analysis (ROA) allows an investor to 
define the optimal time to invest or to estimate the value of project 
uncertainties, because RO methodology enables to assess management 
flexibility of a project (Santos et al. 2014). Contrary to the common belief derived 
from NPV valuation techniques, not all the subsidies are attractive for 
companies. From the NPV standpoint any additional income (due to grants) is 
always positive for the project valuation as the drawback imposed by the public 
institution (always implies a reduction of the managerial flexibility as further 
explained) cannot be included into the calculation. This first case will explain why 
companies should require a minimum grant to accept, considering the value lost 
due to flexibility reduction. 
So, by considering the private company perspective, the first goal of this 
doctoral thesis is to assess the loss of flexibility imposed to management, and 
therefore the resulting need to determine the lower limit of a grant from which 
companies should not accept public R&D funds. For this purpose, this study will 
analyse an investment in a Concentrated Solar Power (CSP) R&D project through 
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the application of NPV traditional method, then the project is valuated with RO 
methodology, in order to assess the loss of flexibility associated with the fact of 
accepting a grant.  
Specifically, the methodology employed consisted of the use of ROV to asses, 
at the end of each year, the economic sense it would have to continue with the 
R&D, to postpone it one year or even to abandon it. Companies have realized 
that R&D project management differs from traditional projects. The main 
uncertainty in the latter is the market risk that might affect future cash-in. 
However, an R&D project is affected not only by market evolution, but also by 
its technical success and the potential emergence of substitutes during the 
development of the product. Therefore, R&D requires a specific management 
framework to handle its risks and decisions to be taken during its lifecycle. In 
this sense, a new approach was developed to manage R&D projects, known as 
stage-gate methodology. This framework allows companies not to commit all 
the resources for a project at the very beginning, but it establishes several gates 
the project would pass or not depending on the technical success and the 
market evolution. If a project seems to be viable and the market perspectives 
are reasonable good, according to stage-gate methodology, the company 
should release more funds to continue the development. This tool ensures the 
company does not devote too many resources to a project about to fail or which 
will not be profitable in the future. Thus, the managerial flexibility is quantified 
(ie. the difference between the traditional NPV technique and the ROV). Grants 
not balancing the loss of flexibility are clearly a value destroyer. The specific 
example of this article presents a new solar tracker in 1998 with a subsidy 
granted by the European Commission; imposing deadlines to its finalization and 
not allowing the abandon option. With those limitations, a minimum grant of 
17.25% is required, much lower than the 50% provided by the EC for that project. 
The question here is if the public institution excessively funded the project. 
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In order to complement the ROV from the private company perspective, this 
doctoral thesis considers also the public institution perspective. In this sense, 
private R&D investment in renewable energy technologies is often associated 
with market failure from the economic perspective (Gillingham & Sweeney 
2010). This designation is employed to describe a situation in which there are 
no conditions to reach an efficient allocation of resources (Stiglitz 1988). Thus, 
companies that invest in this type of project do not realise the full potential 
benefits that said projects could generate. Specifically, these projects positively 
impact society as society benefits from a less polluted environment, for instance. 
In fact, society demands greater investment by private companies in renewable 
energy R&D projects that would naturally be carried out by companies under 
perfect market conditions.  
One of the main reasons justifying the use of public funding for private R&D 
investments is precisely to overcome this market inefficiency in order to reach 
the socially optimal level of development (Stiglitz 1988). In this way, public 
funding can help companies to receive some of the potential benefits that are 
generated by their R&D projects, as well as encouraging R&D projects that, due 
to their high cost and risk, would not be undertaken by companies despite being 
socially valuable projects (Hall 2002). 
When public funding for private R&D investment is considered, specifically by 
means of public subsidies, one of the questions that has attracted the attention 
of researchers regards the effect of these public subsidies on private R&D 
investment (David et al. 2000; Ali-Yrkkö 2004; Afcha & León López 2014). In 
particular, the specialized literature has distinguished two types of effect: the 
crowding-in effect, which implies that public subsidies to R&D projects tend to 
stimulate private R&D investment and therefore have an additive effect; and the 
crowding-out effect, which, on the contrary, implies that public subsidies to R&D 
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investments tend to reduce private investment with the result that public 
funding would negatively displace private R&D investment. 
More specifically, the main drivers for public institutions are the widest 
promotion of private R&D investments using the lowest public funding. There is 
a risk, the so-called crowding-out effect, by which above a threshold, more 
public funding reduces the private investment -ie. the public institution has 
granted excessively. This section fully explains to public institution how a grant 
could be equally attractive for companies by reducing the nominal grant but 
enhancing the flexibility embedded (at no cost for the Institution). As shown by 
Zúñiga et al. (Zúñiga-Vicente et al. 2014), the empirical evidence of this effect is 
inconclusive: they found differences that may be due to factors such as the 
countries and industries considered, or the empirical approach conducted. In 
their wide literature review, these authors highlight that most studies have not 
considered the amount of the subsidy granted to the firm in their empirical 
assessments. Various factors, however, support the existence of a level of 
inflection in the subsidy amount that reduces private R&D investment (for 
instance, the rising of specialized workforce costs (Wolff & Reinthaler 2008; 
Mohnen et al. 2008); the reduction of inflection in the efficiency of these 
subsidies for larger projects (Aschhoff 2009; Irwin & Klenow 1996; Setter & 
Tishler 2005; David et al. 2000); or that these projects stop having the desired 
level of efficiency in relation to the social benefits that justify the existence of 
these subsidies). 
Thus, the second goal of this doctoral thesis is, by considering the public 
institution perspective, to fill the gap in the existing literature by establishing a 
reference for policy makers and funding bodies to determine the maximum 
amount of public subsidies to be given to private R&D investment in order to 
accelerate companies’ R&D activity while reducing the crowding-out effect on 
private investment. In order to do so, this paper applies the ROA to the case of 
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an R&D project in solar thermal power carried out by a consortium of European 
companies. 
Similar to the analysis carried out from the private company perspective, a Real 
Options Analysis is performed to determine the value of flexibility such public 
institutions could provide (such as longer periods). By taking into account this 
added value, the nominal grant can be reduced and therefore the crowding-out 
effect risk decreases whereas the public institution has more resources to grant 
additional projects and companies. Furthermore, the numerical case applied to 
illustrate this rationale is the same as the case employed in the analysis from the 
private company perspective; then all the background is shared. However, as in 
the private company perspective the focus was set on the company and how 
much should be the minimum grant to accept the project; in the public 
institution perspective, the focus is switched to the public institution and which 
alternative it has to promote an equally attractive project but minimizing the risk 
of crowding-out (ie. decreasing the private R&D investment). The use of the 
same case for both perspectives is intentional to further enrich the work by 
providing the two points of view of the same numerical example. 
Traditionally, public subsidies to R&D programs, such as the European 
Commission’s Horizon2020 program (EuopeanCommision 2014), restrict the 
flexibility of companies when deciding whether to continue their project. We did 
not confirm the anticipated results in this study; the decision to abandon a 
project, if this were the case, would imply the partial repayment of the public 
subsidy – if the funding body considers the project has not reached a minimum 
level - which, in turn, would reduce the probability of being granted future 
subsidies as a consequence of the reputation loss of the company towards the 
funding body. Likewise, since the probability of a crowding-out effect can be 
expected to increase with the subsidy size (Siddiqui et al. 2007), other things 
being equal, the proposal of this paper also contributes to reducing the 
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probability of said effect because it justifies the reduction of the public subsidy 
to private R&D investment. Hence in restructuring classical grant schemes by 
giving firms options, these companies could decide to undertake projects a few 
years earlier and accept lower levels of grant funding. Thus, a more flexible 
scheme could reduce the crowding-out effect, deferring the inflection point 
where grants are less efficient for attracting private investors. 
Therefore, the main contributions of this doctoral thesis are, firstly, to assess the 
loss of flexibility imposed to management, and therefore the resulting need to 
determine the lower limit of a grant from which companies should not accept 
public R&D funds. Previous studies about R&D projects in renewable energy 
valuation have not considered the loss of flexibility imposed by grants (Santos 
et al. 2014; Martínez-Ceseña et al. 2013; Tsui 2005; Hodota 2006; Trang et al. 
2002). In this respect, this doctoral thesis contributes to strength the RO 
framework to assess energy R&D projects and so, allowing investors to be more 
conscious about costs involved in government grants. Also, ROA has been used 
to policy evaluation (Siddiqui et al. 2007; Yu et al. 2006; Boomsma et al. 2012; 
Lee et al 2011; Lin et al. 2013; Reuter et al. 2012; Monjas-Barroso et al. 2013; 
Zhang et al. 2014). In this sense, policy makers will have a new point of view 
when defining public R&D: the jeopardy of managerial flexibility. A very 
restrictive grant policy would negative impact in the development of projects 
whereas allowing some actions to the companies would increase the projects’ 
value without representing an extra cost to governments. 
Secondly, this doctoral thesis contributes to fill the gap in the existing literature 
by establishing a reference for policy makers and funding bodies to determine 
the maximum amount from public subsidies to be given to private R&D 
investment in order to accelerate companies’ R&D activity while reducing the 
crowding-out effect on private investment. In particular, this doctoral thesis 
contributes to the specialized literature by proposing an assessment system 
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based on ROA that justifies the reduction of the amount of public subsidies for 
private R&D investment by showing that companies could prefer a lower public 
subsidy for their R&D investment, but that the public subsidy allows them 
greater flexibility by permitting options such as abandoning or deferring the 
R&D project. 
The reminder of this doctoral thesis is structured as follows. The second chapter 
presents, on the one hand, a review of the literature regarding RO and 
specifically applied to R&D projects and, on the other hand, and in a 
complementary way, a review of literature related to the main factors that can 
impact the relationship between public subsidies to R&D and private R&D 
investment, as well as the specific influence of the subsidy size on the R&D 
activity of private companies. The third chapter describes the methodology 
employed in this work in order to reach our two goals, whereas the fourth and 
fifth chapters present, respectively, the results of the empirical studies carried 
out, as well as the discussion of the results. Finally, the sixth chapter presents 
the main conclusions of this doctoral thesis, indicating limitations to the current 
research and further research to this work.  
  












Chapter II. Theoretical framework 
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This chapter presents the theoretical framework of this doctoral thesis. Firstly, 
a review of literature regarding RO is presented, by considering in particular the 
evolution of the RO theory, its application to R&D projects, and its consideration 
for the policy evaluation of renewable energy projects. Secondly, the previous 
literature review is complemented with the rationale for R&D grants, by 
considering specifically the reasons to subsidize R&D projects, the main factors 
that can impact the relationship between public subsidies to R&D and private 
R&D investment, as well as the main effects on companies. 
 
2.1. RO Theory 
A financial option is the right but not the obligation to trade products at a specific 
time for a predetermined price (Ross 2003). These products are contracts 
between two parties, typically consumers and sellers. RO is the extension of that 
financial theory but for real assets assessments. Therefore, a RO can be defined 
as the right but not the obligation to make an investment decision concerning 
real assets (Menegaki 2008), for instance defer its development, build a 
prototype, abandon the project, alter its scale, switch to another technology, etc 
(Martínez-Ceseña et al. 2011). These possible actions are known as managerial 
flexibility, and it enhances the value of the projects. There are two options studied 
in this paper: one is the defer option, giving the manager the ability to wait for 
investing the money. The value of this time of waiting comes as a result of the 
more information about the investment obtained or the resolution of an 
uncertainty (such a new law or regulation in process) (Dixit et al. 1994). The 
second one is the abandon option, which reflects in a more realistic manner the 
reality of the project; if the evolution of the market or the technical success is not 
as expected, the company can stop investing in a non-profitable project.  
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In other words, RO account for management flexibility which delivers a significant 
value contribution in the presence of uncertainty. Technically, the RO method is 
more appropriate for valuation of R&D projects than DCF, because plans are 
options, not assets. For a real option, the underlying security is the present value 
of the business plan (Boer 2004). Special features of energy R&D projects suggest 
ROA to be more suitable than traditional methods like NPV to assess their 
economic valuation, as shown by Santos et al. (Santos et al. 2014).In most cases, 
energy R&D projects are irreversible because associated investments are partially 
or completely irreversible. Therefore, the assets of these projects cannot be used 
in other activities or different companies. Besides that, there is a high level of 
commercial uncertainty, especially in the liberalized electricity market 
(Kumbaroğlu  et al. 2008). Moreover, investment can occur in a flexible time. 
Finally, by designing the project, investors have several generation technologies 
that are associated with different uncertainty levels. Therefore, ROA has been 
recommended to be more appropriate than traditional NPV for judging R&D 
projects (Hartmann et al. 2006).  
Myers (Myers 1977) was the first who recognized the analogy between financial 
options and real world investments, being the one who coined the expression 
“real option”, based on the resemblance between R&D investments can be 
valued similar to financial options. Mapping an investment opportunity onto a 
call option (Olilla 2000) implies the stock price would be equal to the present 
value of the project’s operating assets to be acquired (or developed); the exercise 
price is the expenditure required (or the R&D investment), the time to expiration 
would be the length of time the decision may be deferred, the risk-free rate of 
return equals the time value of money and finally the variance of returns on stock, 
the riskiness of the projects assets.  
The evolution of financial options began in the early 70s due to growing 
dissatisfaction with DCF methods at the same time significant breakthroughs in 
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options theory were developed by Fisher Black, Myron Scholes (Black et al. 1973) 
and Robert Merton (Merton 1973) who were the first to price their value. Later 
on, Cox introduced the pricing formula for binomial trees (Cox et al. 1979). 
Decision trees only capture the substantial value of the option to abandon; 
however, RO captures the value from the management of market risk (risk that 
cannot be diversified) who adapt the project to the market circumstances. 
However, other approaches have been taken for getting the valuation of RO. For 
instance, Amran and Kulatilaka (Amram et al. 1999) use partial differential 
equations to express mathematically the value of an option and its dynamics 
(Fernandez et al. 2011). Finally, another approach is to simulate the uncertainty 
with Monte-Carlo. 
 
2.2. Application of RO to R&D projects 
The problem with DCF is the mind-set that has developed around it. For example, 
the Japanese approach to R&D valuation is not consistent with DCF thinking, 
because growth and market are more important than return on investment (ROI) 
(Faulkner 1996). Despite of that, DCF is still commonly used in R&D valuation. 
However, there are several cases in literature in which RO are applied to R&D 
projects. For instance, Tsui (Tsui 2005) applies the RO theory to fuel cell vehicles, 
Hodota (Hodota 2006) to an intelligent transportation system, and Trang (Trang 
et al. 2002) to the pharmaceutical industry. All of them valuate the project with 
DCF that implies no flexibility. Over that value, normally a decision tree is 
considered, increasing the value due to the abandon option. Finally, RO provide 
the higher value because it accounts for all the potential flexibility related to the 
project. 
In the field of renewable energies, Venetsanos et al. (Venetsanos et al. 2002) 
proposed a framework for the appraisal of power projects under uncertainty 
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within a competitive market environment. This framework includes these stages: 
uncertainty and resource attributes, RO identification of the project and 
evaluation of the project value. Using a Black-Scholes model, ROA provided a 
positive option value of a wind project and DCF gave a negative value. Amran 
and Kulatilaka (Amram et al. 1999) define a methodology to value RO based on 
four steps: (i) frame the application by identifying the possible decisions that 
could be taken and when they might be made; (ii) implementation of the option 
valuation model (in this paper, a binomial lattice is approached); (iii) review the 
results and compare them against other methods (in this case, against NPV); and 
(iv) redesign the option model valuation to produce better results. In this work, 
a recommendation to policy makers is done.  
ROA has been used to evaluate renewable energy technologies in the face of 
uncertain fossil fuels (Davis et al. 2003). In fact, most of recent papers have 
considered these external uncertainties (market price of fuel or electricity), 
because it is the easiest type of uncertainty to handle in RO models, with the 
added advantage of not having interactions with the performance of the project. 
However, renewable energy projects have at least one internal uncertainty: wind 
speed, water flows, solar radiation, new equipment efficiency, etc. (Martínez-
Ceseña et al. 2013). Specially, RO research about wind or photovoltaic projects is 
beginning to address these internal uncertainties (Fleten et al. 2004; Sarkis et al. 
2008; Ashuri et al. 2011). So, for instance, in hydropower projects the most 
frequent uncertainty is the water flow (Hedman et al. 2006; Zhang et al. 2005; 
Kjærland 2010). 
Santos et al. (Santos et al. 2014) applies RO to a mini-hydro power plant and 
Martínez and Mutale (Martínez-Ceseña et al. 2011) describe the case of a 
hydropower plant comparing between three different valuation methods: the 
first is using DCF; secondly what the authors call typical RO (including only the 
option to deferral the project); and finally the advanced RO in which also the time 
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and design of the project are options. In absence of all flexibility, RO behaves as 
DCF; but if there is some flexibility, RO would increase the project’s value. 
Therefore, the minimum value in RO equals the optimal DCF.  
Siddiqui and Fleten (Siddiqui et al. 2010) analyse how a firm may proceed with 
staged commercialization and deployment of alternative energy technologies. It 
is remarkable the work carried out by Karamitsos (Karamitsos 2009) because the 
company perspective is considered, not in terms of analysing grants but on 
comparing methodologies to evaluate R&D projects in the power sector. 
 
2.3. RO in policy evaluation of renewable energy projects 
Unlike fossil energy that is consolidated in the current environment, renewable 
energy is in an important stage of its development and it needs the support of 
policy. Environmental policies are associated to uncertainties such as carbon, fuel 
or electricity prices or natural resources. For this reason, RO is an effective tool 
to evaluate energy projects. Thus, the RO theory has been used by some authors 
to analyze the policy evaluation of renewable energy in several countries. 
In this research line, Kumbaroglu et al. (Kumbaroğlu  et al. 2008) designed a 
model to guide policy planning in relation to renewable energy projects in Turkey 
and concluded that the diffusion of renewable energy technologies occurs only 
if there are targeted policies. Lee and Shih (Lee et al. 2010) applied RO into 
renewable power generation in Taiwan, and they proposed a model that is useful 
to quantify the policy value on different renewable energy development policy. 
Also, in the case of Taiwan and for wind energy technologies, Lee and Shih (Lee 
et al. 2011) constructed a model based on the binomial RO method that helps 
reduce policy implementation costs and facilitate an estimation of benefits 
brought by specific policies. For the cases of wind power and pumped storage in 
Germany and Norway, Reuter et al. (Reuter et al. 2012) employed a RO model to 
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investigate the specific characteristics of renewable technologies and their 
associated uncertainties by taking into account market effects of investment 
decisions. Monjas and Balibrea (Monjas-Barroso et al. 2013) conducted a 
comparative study on an investment project on renewable energy in Denmark, 
Finland and Portugal, based on RO. This study assessed how the ROs affect the 
expanded net present value of the project and also evaluated the public 
incentives in these countries for wind energy. Lin and Wesseh (Lin et al. 2013) 
studied the feed-in tariff for solar power generation via RO in China. An 
important conclusion of this study is that solar energy technologies in China have 
a significant amount of value that cannot be detected when the hidden costs of 
non-renewable energy are not reflected through prices. Boomsma et al. 
(Boomsma et al. 2012) analyzed both feed-in tariff and renewable energy 
certificate trading under a RO approach in a case study based on wind power in 
Norway. So, while feed-in tariff encourages earlier investment, renewable energy 
certificate trading creates incentives for larger projects when the investment has 
been undertaken. Yu et al. (Yu et al. 2006) evaluated the use of feed-in tariff in 
the wind energy sector in the Spanish market. By using a RO analysis, these 
authors conclude that both the values and operation risk of wind generation 
assets are changed by the switchable tariff. Recently, Zhang et al. (Zhang et al. 
2014) have proposed a RO model to evaluate the unit decision value and save-
path rate for renewable energy development and they applied this model to the 
case of the solar photovoltaic power generation in China. 
The studies above mentioned have contributed to the specialized literature 
about the use of RO in policy evaluation of renewable energy projects. In this 
research line, our study aims to do a contribution to this literature by considering 
the cost for companies as a consequence of the loss of flexibility that is due to 
the grant of a subsidy to develop an R&D project. An example relative to a 
renewable energy technology is presented, using for its analysis the RO theory. 
In this sense, the cost of this loss of flexibility should be considered both by 
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companies when they develop an investment project and by policy makers when 
they design a subsidy policy for renewable energy projects. 
 
2.4. Rationale for R&D grants: motivation, limitations and effect on companies 
This section describes the main goals sought by Governments and public bodies 
when subsidising private R&D investment. Furthermore, a set of limitations to 
this process is described. 
 
2.4.1. Reasons to subsidise R&D investments 
There are several justifications for the subsidisation of R&D investment, first and 
foremost being the uncertainty surrounding the technical and economic success 
of an R&D project and its potential benefits (Dasgupta & Maskin 1987). In fact, 
government R&D expenditures are funded through public agencies because it 
may generate social benefits beyond the direct provision of government services. 
A further objective is pursued with this spending: generating social benefits in 
the form of knowledge and “training” spillovers (David et al. 2000). Second, a 
company will never be able to appropriate all returns of a successful R&D project 
because the developed knowledge can quickly and easily diffuse into the public 
domain (Arrow 1962). These are positive externalities to society that are not 
remunerated to firms. Third, firms take the risk that the knowledge created in 
their R&D programme will be available to other companies (free riders), taking 
advantage of the progress of R&D programmes from competitors (Arrow 1962). 
Fourth, external funding for R&D projects is relatively scarce. Managers are 
reluctant to reveal all the features of company projects to external parties, 
including investors, due to the strategic nature of R&D activities and to avoid 
disclosing critical information to competitors (Ughetto 2008). Investors are 
discouraged from supporting R&D projects because they face problems of 
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information asymmetry, such as adverse selection and moral hazard (Stiglitz & 
Weiss 1981). R&D investments are more risky and their assessment is less reliable 
for external parties (Czarnitzki et al. 2011). In subsidising R&D projects, both firms 
and investors are compensated for several reasons: the uncertainty of the project, 
the spillover benefits R&D expenditures provide to society, and the increased risk 
and reduced cost of capital. Therefore, because subsidies are a necessary tool for 
the development of knowledge in society, this paper contributes to optimising 
how they are awarded. 
 
2.4.2. Limiting factors 
The main factors regarding the equilibrium between public R&D subsidies and 
private R&D investment are reviewed below. Probably the most important issue, 
one which also deeply affects this work, is the effect of the size of the grant given 
to firms and its effects on firms’ R&D activity. 
 
2.4.2.1. The equilibrium between public R&D subsidies and private R&D 
investment 
The results of studies on the relationship between public R&D subsidies and 
private R&D investment are highly heterogeneous due to, among other reasons, 
the differences between each analysed industrial sector, the country to which the 
firms belong, and the methodology employed (Zúñiga-Vicente et al. 2014). In the 
specialised literature, it is nevertheless possible to distinguish some factors that 
have been frequently considered, such asthe size of the firm, the economic 
context, the type of incentive, and the recurrence in the public funding. As it is 
most likely the most important issue, the size of the grant will be discussed 
separately in following subsections. 
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2.4.2.2. Size of the firm 
As regards the size of the firm, Busom (Busom ∗ 2000) found in a sample of 
Spanish companies that smaller firms are more likely to apply for and be granted 
a subsidy. This is probably aligned with the public agency's goals, which may be 
to incentivise R&D investment in small and medium enterprises (SMEs). In the 
same sense, in another study on Spanish firms, González & Pazó (González & 
Pazó 2008) concluded that subsidies have a greater effect on inducing new R&D 
activities in smaller firms. Meanwhile, Ali-Yrkkö (Ali-Yrkkö 2004) concluded that 
receiving a positive decision to obtain public R&D funds increases privately 
financed R&D and that this effect is also bigger in large firms than in small firms, 
although the results of Löof & Heshmati (Lööf & Heshmati 2005) show that there 
are additive effects of public R&D financing on private research expenditures 
only for small firms. Duguet (Duguet 2003) considered a sample of French firms 
and found that the probability of being awarded a subsidy increases with the 
debt ratio and the importance of privately funded R&D, as well as with the size 
of firms. Görg & Strobl (Görg & Strobl 2007) conducted their study on Irish firms 
and concluded that for small domestic plants, grants serve to increase private 
R&D spending. In their study of a sample of Turkish firms, ÖzceliK & Taymaz 
(Özçelik & Taymaz 2008) found that smaller R&D players benefit more from R&D 
support and therefore with better performance research, which suggests again 
that public R&D support is likely to play a more important role in stimulating 
private R&D in small firms. Moreover, regarding Belgian firms, Meuleman & De 
Maeseneire (Meuleman & De Maeseneire 2012) found that obtaining an R&D 
subsidy provides a positive signal about the quality of small and medium-sized 
enterprises and results in better access to long-term debt. They further found 
that investors and banks may require firms to obtain an R&D subsidy as a 
condition for receiving funds. 
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2.4.2.3. Economic context 
In relation to small and medium-sized enterprises but also considering the 
influence of the economic context in their study, Hud & Hussinger (Hud & 
Hussinger 2015) analysed the impact of public R&D subsidies on the R&D 
investment of German companies during the latest economic crisis. They found 
an overall positive effect of R&D subsidies on R&D investment attitude from 
companies, although there is evidence of a crowding-out effect during the 2009 
crisis. Furthermore, when the German economy started to recover in 2010, the 
subsidy effect was smaller than in the pre-crisis years. Wiser & Pickle (Wiser & 
Pickle 1998) also considered the influence of the economic and political context 
in which companies develop the power plant financing process for renewable 
energy projects. They conducted five case studies showing policies that do not 
provide long-term stability or that have negative secondary impacts on 
investment decisions will increase financing costs and therefore could 
dramatically reduce policy effectiveness. This work specifically highlights that the 
importance of policy stability to renewable energy developers and financial 
investors should not be underestimated. In fact, changes in renewable energy 
subsidies have tended to be abrupt and therefore disruptive to developers and 
investors. 
 
2.4.2.4. Type of incentive 
The effect of the type of incentive on the relationship between public R&D 
subsidies and private R&D investment has also been considered by specialised 
literature. In this vein, Guellec & Potterie (Guellec 1997) analysed whether tax 
incentives and direct subsidies stimulate business-funded R&D in 17 OECD 
countries. They found that although tax incentives and direct subsidies stimulate 
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private R&D investments in the short run, direct subsidies are more effective than 
tax incentives in the long term. In a later study also considering figures from 17 
OECD countries, Guellec & Potterie (Guellec & Van Pottelsberghe De La Potterie 
2003) concluded that both direct government funding of R&D performed by 
firms and R&D tax incentives have a positive effect on business financed R&D 
and that they are more effective when they are stable over time. Another 
important conclusion of Guellec & Potterie (Guellec & Van Pottelsberghe De La 
Potterie 2003) was that direct government funding and R&D tax incentives are 
substitutes. Thus, the increased intensity of one reduces the effect of the other 
on private R&D. More recently, Abolhosseini & Heshmati (Abolhosseini & 
Heshmati 2014) compared feed-in-tariffs, tax incentives and tradable green 
certificates as the main mechanisms used by governments to finance renewable 
energy development programmes. They concluded that tax credits constitute an 
attractive mechanism for private investors because they directly increase investor 
liquidity. On the other hand, while feed-in-tariffs are a suitable mechanism as a 
policy to develop renewable energy sources when low investor risk is preferred, 
tradable green certificates constitute the most appropriate policy when the 
government applies a market view policy. 
 
2.4.2.5. Recurrence in public funding 
Regarding the recurrence of being granted public funding, the literature 
indicates that a firm whose R&D activity was subsidised in the past is more likely 
to be subsidised again (González & Pazó 2008). Nevertheless, Zúñiga et al. 
(Zúñiga-Vicente et al. 2014) noted that there are different reasons supporting 
alternative assumptions about the effect of public subsidies on private R&D 
investment. For example, because firms that are granted public subsidies for their 
R&D are more likely to benefit from grants that reduce their own risk and cost 
of financing R&D projects, the odds of a crowding-out effect for frequent 
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recipients of R&D subsidies are increased (Lööf & Heshmati 2005). Alternatively, 
it can be argued that because firms that have received a subsidy for a R&D 
project may subsequently apply for new subsidies to keep financing the same 
project, it can be expected that public R&D subsidies have a crowding-in effect 
on these firms’ R&D investments (Duguet 2003). 
 
2.4.2.6. Size of the subsidy granted to firms 
One of the most debated issues has been the effect of the grant size on the 
crowding-in and crowding-out effects; in other words, does increasing the 
amount of the subsidy also increase private spending invested in R&D projects, 
or conversely, does it lead to decreasing R&D expenditures by firms? Several 
arguments have been provided by the literature in order to explain why R&D 
subsidies can lead to the displacement of private R&D. 
There are contrary reasons for supporting “the more the better”, resulting in the 
crowding-out effect of private funding. This means public funding may result in 
an undesirable replacement effect of the private investment. The main factor 
hindering R&D activities is the lack of qualified personnel (Mohnen et al. 2008). 
An inefficiency, as a result of R&D activities supported by public grants, is the 
higher demand for R&D personnel, increasing their wages (Wolff & Reinthaler 
2008). R&D subsidies can easily translate into researcher wage increases 
(Goolsbee 1998).  
The size of projects can be another variable to be considered as a cause of 
displacement of private R&D investment (Aschhoff 2009). First, stimulation 
effects are more likely for large projects than for small ones. Thus, small projects 
have a higher tendency to lead to a crowding-out effect than larger projects. 
Second, a firm’s R&D capacity cannot be extended at will in the short-run even 
if the firm is awarded public support for a project. Firms cannot be willing to 
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make excessive long term employment commitments. If larger projects are 
subsidised and considering a restricted R&D employment market, firms 
undertake the large projects, reallocating funds and employers from other 
projects to the subsidised project and abandoning those previous projects. This 
would result in a reduction of private R&D investment. Other dangers of 
excessive grants are financing duplicate R&D and redirecting financing towards 
more risky (Irwin & Klenow 1996) and thus less successful projects (Setter & 
Tishler 2005). Moreover, government incentives can lead to the creation of 
expensive R&D facilities (David et al. 2000), but firms equipped with this R&D 
infrastructures may continue to apply for new subsidised R&D projects in order 
to cover these fixed costs, without regard for improved economic performance 
and the advancement of knowledge. The project could be concluded without 
social benefits and the firm would not profit beyond the coverage of its fixed 
costs. These firms with more experience and better equipment for R&D could 
prevent other companies with better projects from being awarded R&D 
subsidies. 
 
2.4.3. Effect on companies 
As Aschoff (Aschhoff 2009) proposes, there are different effects of grants on a 
firm’s R&D expenditures: a full crowding-out effect, if R&D subsidies substitute 
company expenditures; partial crowding-out, if the firm’s expenditures in R&D 
would decrease in the situation of public funding; no effect of subsidies on a 
firm’s own R&D; and an additional effect, if the firm increases privately financed 
R&D spending when subsidies are received.  
The literature shows ambiguous results regarding these findings. A full crowding-
out effect has been rejected by (Aerts et al. 2006; Clausen 2007; Ali-Yrkkö 2004; 
Kaiser 2006; Heijs & Herrera 2004; Görg & Strobl 2007), whereas Lach (Lach 2002) 
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found a partial replacement of private R&D expenditures with public funding. 
Streicher et al. (Streicher et al. 2004) found that private funding increases when 
R&D projects are subsidised by public grants. Aerts (Aerts 2008) asserted these 
mixed results are due to the heterogeneity of samples belonging to different 
countries and industrial sectors.  
Görg and Strobl (Görg & Strobl 2007) found additional effects of small grants, 
rejecting the crowding-out of medium grants. Aschhoff (Aschhoff 2009) also 
showed that grants should have a minimum size to cause an impact on a firm’s 
privately financed R&D and that medium- and large-scale grants increase firms’ 
R&D spending depending on the size of the project.  
Larger projects are more dependent on public funding. Guellec and 
Pottelsberghe (Guellec & Van Pottelsberghe De La Potterie 2003) found an 
inverted U-shaped curve in the relationship between public subsidies and private 
expenditures in R&D funding. The subsidy effect is positive but marginally 
decreasing up to a certain threshold, beyond which the effect becomes negative. 
This confirms a crowding-in effect of moderate grants and a crowding-out effect 
for subsidies beyond a certain level (Zúñiga-Vicente et al. 2014). 
  











Chapter III. Methodology 
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This section of the doctoral thesis explains the methodology utilized to 
determine the value of the flexibility for both the companies and the public 
institutions for specific R&D projects.  
 
3.1. Factors considered in R&D project valuation & Stage-gate framework 
Companies have realized that R&D project management differs from traditional 
projects. The main uncertainty in the latter is the market risk that might affect 
future cash-in. However, an R&D project is affected not only by market evolution, 
but also by its technical success and the potential emergence of substitutes 
during the development of the product. Therefore, R&D requires a specific 
management framework to handle its risks and decisions to be taken during its 
lifecycle. In this sense, a new approach was developed to manage R&D projects, 
known as stage-gate methodology (Cooper et al. 2018). R&D projects, in contrast 
with traditional large projects, differ mainly in the high uncertainty related to the 
investment, not only due to the uncertainty of the market demand for the product 
being developed but also to the probability of technical success. Therefore, 
companies must adapt their investment in order not to commit excessive 
resources to a potential failure. Cooper (Cooper et al. 2018) proposed a scheme 
by which each phase of the R&D project – namely the initial design, advanced 
design, first prototype, scale-up, and commercial - is given a specific budget and 
deadline. By doing so, the project is forced through a review process before 
beginning a new phase. These periodic revisions allow the managers to pause the 
development, cancel (kill) the project if the expectations are not promising, or the 
reverse, boost investment to reach the goals earlier than originally planned. These 
options on the part of managers are essential to the point of this article.  
First, the mere option of companies to abandon the project adds value to the 
R&D investment because not all the resources must be committed at the outset. 
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This may seem obvious; however, using traditional DCF techniques, this possibility 
is not modelled.  
Second, the company has the option to defer (pause) the project for a few years 
to gain information about the market or the technology. This delay also has value 
because if the new market expectations are more promising, the company can 
continue the R&D project while retaining the possibility to abandon it in the 
future. Again, traditional DCF cannot include this deferment action in the model. 
Third, if the technical success seems to be even better than initially planned or 
the market demand is greater, the company can allocate more resources to finish 
the R&D project earlier and therefore arrive sooner to the market. As DCF does 
not model any change during simulations, this possibility is again neglected.  
This framework allows companies not to commit all the resources for a project at 
the very beginning, but it establishes several gates the project would pass or not 
depending on the technical success and the market evolution. If a project seems 
to be viable and the market perspectives are reasonable good, according to 
stage-gate methodology, the company should release more funds to continue 
the development. This tool ensures the company does not devote too many 
resources to a project about to fail or which will not be profitable in the future. 
As mention above, lying behind a stage-gate decision, there are at least two RO. 
One of them is the option to abandon the project (at each gate) and the second 
would be the decision to defer the project. For instance, it could be a defer 
decision based on the current market estimations, or due to a certain regulation 
under discussion. The project could be delayed one year and re-evaluated to 
decide then either to continue or not with more information available.  
To evaluate an R&D project using NPV, the first step is to estimate the total 
market for the technology and the correspondent market share. This market share 
would be translated into a cash-in per year during the commercialization phase. 
Prior to that, an R&D investment phase is necessary in which there is cash-out 
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from the company. Using discounted cash flow, the future cash-in would be 
discounted together with the cash-out. If the NPV is above cero, the project would 
be undertaken. The main issue applying DCF is to determine the discount rate, 
which is related to the cost of capital of the company, representing its opportunity 
cost.  
The second uncertainty would be the technical success of the R&D phase 
(Siddiqui et al. 2007), in which NPV “simulates” private risk by adding subjective 
probabilities. Using Monte-Carlo simulation, a probability distribution of the NPV 
can be obtained, depending on the market and technical variables and 
probabilities associated to each iteration.  
In the analysis of R&D projects using DCF, the effect of grants is always beneficial. 
Grants will reduce the R&D investment phase; therefore the NPV will increase no 
matter the conditions imposed to the project by the funding agency, because 
DCF cannot handle them and they are not included in the numerical analysis. 
 
3.2. Common R&D incentives in Spain and Europe 
There are plenty of incentives for R&D projects, as explained in the literature 
review of section 2. The subsidies most frequently used in Spain and given by the 
European Commission are direct funds to undertake an R&D project. Tax 
incentives are more oriented to past R&D activities or the commercial exploitation 
of results rather than to initiate new projects.  
Depending on the technical maturity of the technology, being the distinction 
between Research and Development, and the type of the beneficiary of the 
incentive (privately or publicly held, small, medium or large company), there is a 
range of incentives between 25% and 100%. For mature projects, Spanish funding 
starts at 25% for large companies. This funding rate increases up to 100% for 
Research projects and/or R&D centres. 
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In addition to the financial help, there is a drawback for companies accepting 
these incentives, namely, the lack of flexibility. Accepting one of these grants 
imposes a deadline to finish the project based on a project chart and the 
minimum execution of budgeted costs. The three options explained above 
contrast somewhat with the traditional way of valuing incentives. These 
drawbacks are completely ignored by DCF because this model would not include 
the lack of flexibility imposed nor the potential advantage of developing a 
technology or product earlier or faster.  
Using the RO framework, a more suitable tool for valuing these options will be 
taken into account and a recommendation for funding bodies will therefore be 
proposed.  
 
3.3. Qualitative effect of grants in terms of managerial flexibility 
Real option theory is well known for enhancing the value of projects under 
uncertainty (Martínez-Ceseña et al. 2013). In R&D projects this managerial 
flexibility would be only considered if managers are willing to exercise the 
options. This might not be always the case if managers cannot or are reluctant to 
apply all the options, for instance they could be not willing to abandon their 
project. In those cases the use of RO is useless because it provides a value 
considering a managerial flexibility that is not real.  
As stated before, stage-gate is a well-known methodology to manage R&D 
projects in which there are at least two RO embedded: the option to abandon the 
project at each gate and the option to defer the investment.  Scholars have deeply 
analysed how to apply RO to a project model to include the managerial flexibility. 
Particularly, Fernandes et al. (Fernandez et al. 2011) analyse the ability to delay an 
investment, in order to obtain more information and thus reducing uncertainty.  
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However, it is at this point where a grant imposes some restrictions to the project. 
A company receiving public R&D funds limits its managerial flexibility. To keep 
the analysis numerically tractable and for clarity purposes, we will assume a 
company applying the stage-gate methodology to its R&D projects; simplified to 
two RO (abandon and defer). The concession of a grant limits both RO: 
- Abandon option: this option will not be possible any longer. Otherwise, the 
company should have to refund the grant back to the funding agency.  
- Defer option: a priori, a company could defer the development of the R&D 
project as much as considered –without taking into account competitors’ 
reactions. However, a grant imposes a deadline to the project. 
 
3.4. Case approach  
The structure of the case would be firstly to determine the value of the project 
using NPV. Afterwards, the beneficial financial effect of grants is considered, thus 
reducing R&D investment and therefore increasing NPV. Thirdly, a RO model is 
applied to evaluate the project with two sources of flexibility: abandon and defer. 
Finally, the value of the two options limited by the grant will be calculated. 
Therefore, a contrast between the financial benefit from the grant and the limit in 
the managerial flexibility provides the minimum grant acceptable by the 
company. To avoid excessive noise in the model, an old project has been chosen 
so that there is no uncertainty in the market demand. DCF is applied to the R&D 
investment costs, the accepted grant, and the commercial revenues; the NPV is 
straightforward. One of the ideas in this doctoral thesis, however, is to accelerate 
the start of the project by two years, although the commercial revenues start 
flowing in the same year. In this case, a larger grant would be required.  
By using real options valuation (ROV), the existing flexibility embedded in the 
project is evaluated, determining the equivalent grant.  Different modifications of 
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the case will be presented, all of them calculated using ROV to include the 
managerial flexibility.  
NPV analysis presents limitations with regard to the assessment of R&D projects. 
Specifically, according to Borissiouk and Peli (Borissiouk et al. 2001), two 
important limitations of this method are that firstly it uses a discount rate that is 
constant, although different rates should be used at each R&D stage due to the 
changes in future uncertainty; and secondly, NPV tends to underestimate the 
potential value of projects because it ignores the impact of economic uncertainty. 
Specifically, Borissiouk and Peli (Borissiouk et al. 2001) argue that the value of 
managerial flexibility to adjust the development process (of a technology, in our 
case) to the uncertainty is disregarded (Trigeorgis 1996). Similarly, Martín-Barrera 
et al. (Martín-Barrera et al. 2016) highlight that NPV underestimates the value of 
R&D projects because, although flexibility adds value to R&D projects, this 
method fails to adequately reflect the flexibility of decision-making. 
Managerial flexibility is particularly necessary  for the assessment R&D projects 
because their development takes place over decades and their return is not 
generally achieved in the short-term(Lee & Shih 2010). Their profits are collected 
in future investment opportunities following a successful R&D project (Myers 
1977). With specific regard to Renewable Energy projects, the assessment using 
NPV is not suitable due to the fact that such projects are subject to the high 
volatility of energy markets during their prolonged development (Myers 1977; 
Lee et al. 2010; Duffie et al. 1999). In this regard, a full review of traditional 
methods used in energy markets, besides NPV, that are suitable for assessing 
energy projects can be found in Santos et al. (Santos et al. 2014): internal rate of 
return, return on investment, payback period, benefit-cost ratio and levelised cost. 
These traditional methods consider risk but, ignoring management opportunities 
arising in the duration of project, they do not take into account the possibilities 
for reducing risk with the management of investments.  
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For the purposes of simplicity, only two options are considered from the 
company’s perspective: defer and abandon. For the funding body, it will be 
interesting to analyse the effect on companies undertaking the R&D project 
earlier. This may lead to the company obtaining commercial revenues and the 
country benefitting from technological development sooner.  
 
3.4.1. NPV calculation 
The choice of an old R&D project has been intentional to avoid simulations on 
market and market share evolutions. The commercial revenue of the project can 
be calculated with certainty because the market share is already know, as well as 
costs and benefits of the R&D project.  
Using a DCF method with the commercial revenues and the R&D costs, the NPV 
is straightforward. The only parameter to define is the discount rate. This will be 
explained in the numerical case. 
 
3.4.2. Effect of grants in NPV 
The previous NPV will be enhanced once the grant is considered. The effect of 
the grant is translated into revenues during the R&D investment phase. This 
means, the total cash flow on the project improves because there will be more 
cash-in.  
 
3.4.3. RO model 
Next step is to quantitatively asses how much value do the abandon and the defer 
options add to the project. A binomial lattice approach is followed (Kodukula et 
al. 2006).  
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Once the managerial flexibility has been quantified, the limit imposed by the 
funding agency is calculated and contrasted with the financial benefit from 
previous section. The result will be the minimum grant that equals the value lost 
by the limitation of managerial flexibility.   









Chapter IV. First case: The Private Company 
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The first case of this doctoral thesis is to present the point of view of the 
private company. The following numerical case will explore the minimum grant 
threshold a private company should require in order to accept such grant. 
Contrarily to the wrong conclusion of NPV by which all the grants are positive for 
the company; this section calculates the value of flexibility of a R&D project lost 
due to the grant; and therefore the minimum grant to compensate such loss of 
value. 
 
4.1. Project description 
In the renewable energy sector, the solar power is increasingly important. The 
International Energy Agency (IEA) forecasts more than 400 GW of electrical 
capacity installed in year 2035 (IEA 2008) even in its most pessimistic scenario. 
Within solar technology, there are two main alternatives: photovoltaic (PV) and 
concentrated solar power (CSP). The latter is relatively new and it is gaining 
market share. According to the IEA, it will double its capacity by 2030.  
CSP uses mirrors or lenses to concentrate a large area of sunlight onto a small 
area. Electrical power is produced when the concentrated light is converted to 
heat which usually drives a steam turbine connected to an electrical power 
generator. There are two main technologies within CSP: towers and troughs. 
Tower uses trackers that follow the sun and concentrate into a solar receiver in 
the top of the tower. Trough (or parabolic trough) consists of a linear parabolic 
reflector that concentrates light onto a receiver positioned along the reflector’s 
focal line (European Solar Thermal Electricity Association 2014). 
The R&D project to be analysed in this paper fits in the trough category, 
particularly to develop a new trough, longer than the previously used at that time 
being 150 meters long instead of the 100 m length used by its competitors. 
Besides economies of scale, this new tracker had the advantage of being lighter 
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due to a new design, reduction of operation and maintenance costs due to easier 
mirror cleaning, less complex realignment requirements, and fewer components. 
The project name was ‘Eurotrough’ and it was made by a consortium of 
companies in the late 90s (Ciemat et al. 2014). 
The project received two grants from the European Commission (EC) under two 
different contracts covering sequential stages of the development. Table 1 
summarizes the total declared costs and public R&D funds from the European 
Union (EU contribution) per contract.  
Table 1: Eurotrough I & II start and end dates, declared costs and EU contribution 
 
 Start date End date Total declared 
costs 
EU Contribution 
Eurotrough I 1-Ago-98 31-Jan-01 2.402.514 € 1.199.899 € 
Eurotrough II 1-Oct-00 31-Dec-02 1.993.707 €    996.851 € 
 
Even though CSP plants are complex, large installations with hundreds of design 
parameters (European Solar Thermal Electricity Association 2014), there are two 
particularly important that roughly determine the size and cost: electrical capacity 
which defines the size of the steam turbine; and the storage capacity expressed 
as how many hours the plant is able to work at full load with no sun. There is a 
positive correlation between those two with the size and therefore the cost of the 
plant. The larger the plant is, the more number of solar reflectors are required and 
therefore the improvement per tracker, due to having more efficient troughs, will 
be more substantial. There is a limit in this correlation whereas adding more 
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4.2. Parameter estimation 
The first step is to calculate the improvement the new trough brings over the 
previous one. To do so, a tool, called System Advisor Model, designed by the 
National Renewable Energy Laboratory (NREL) from United States is run (NREL 
2014). This tool enables to simulate the behaviour of all type of CSP plant in any 
location worldwide, defining its main parameters such as electrical capacity, 
storage size and, among others, model of trough.  The output is the NPV of the 
designed plant. 
Simulations1 were run with the trough previous to the R&D project (LS-3) and 
with the developed one (ET150). For both troughs, 10 locations were simulated2 
with different storage hours3 covering all the normal ranges of design. Therefore, 
for each number of storage hours, the average (of the 10 locations) of the 
difference in both troughs’ NPV was calculated, with the results provided in figure 
1. The figure is normalized per unit of installed MW. 
                                                          
1 Parameters of the simulation: Parabolic Trough physical model, Utility Independent Power Producer, 
electrical output of 50 MW, 4 troughs per loop, tracking error of 1.00 for LS-3 and 0.99 for ET150, the 
remaining parameters as default except the model of 2 types of troughs (LS-3 and ET150), 10 locations 
and 16 storage hours. 
2 Phoenix, Tucson, Colorado Springs, Grand Junction, Albuquerque and Tonopah (US), El Cairo Int Airport 
(EGY), Almeria, Granada and Sevilla (ESP). 
3 From 0 to 15 in steps of 1h. 
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Figure 1: ET150 versus LS-3 NPV improvement as function of storage hours 
 
 
These results allow to calculate market revenues of the technology: NREL (NREL 
2014) has registered all the commercial CSP power plants worldwide  indicating 
electrical capacity, type of trough (LS-3, ET150 or others) and storage size. 
Applying the function of improvement in NPV as function of the storage hours 
per installed MW to all the CSP plants retrieved from NREL, the worldwide NPV 
per year is calculated and shown in table 2.  
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Table 2: NPV of commercial revenues discounted at indicated year 
 
2006 243 159.55 € 
2007 952 284.55 € 
2008 1 296 778.64 € 
2009 1 398 113.19 € 
2010 3 343 509.25 € 
2011 2 703 466.25 € 
2012 136 322.02 € 
2013 1 013 243.07 € 
Total 11 086 876.50 € 
 
For the purpose of this paper, there are no more Eurotrough structures foreseen 
to be installed in any future CSP plant. The NPV is discounted to two years prior 
the plant starts operating, because the construction time is, on average, 24 
months. The sum of these NPV discounted at 1998 (the year the R&D project was 
initiated) is the value of the underlying asset. 
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Table 3 summarises all the parameters that will be applied in the case: 
Table 3: Parameters for the binomial tree 
 
Stock price S0 3 634 194.92 € 
Discount rate r 10% 
Volatility σ 30% 
Risk-free rate rf 5% 
Exercise price 1 X1 808 838.00 € 
Exercise price 2 X2 808 838.00 € 
Exercise price 3 X3 808 838.00 € 
Exercise price 4 X4 996 853.50 € 
Exercise price 5 X5 996 853.50 € 
Duration stage 1 T1 1 
Duration stage 2 T2 1 
Duration stage 3 T3 1 
Duration stage 4 T4 1 
Duration stage 5 T5 1 
Incremental time step δt 1 
u = exp (σ√δt) 1.34986 
d = 1/u 0.7408 
p = (exp(rfδt)-d)/(u-d) 0.5097 
 
(1) S0, as stated before, is the value of the underlying asset, calculated discounting 
to 1998 all the NPV of every single CSP plant using Eurotrough built worldwide. 
(2) Discount rate (r) is the opportunity cost of the company undertaking the 
investment. For confidentiality, no discount rate of any of the companies in the 
consortium has been used; but a figure (10%) in the range. Using another 
discount rate would change the absolute results, requiring a higher or lower 
grant, but it would not affect to the analysis nor the discussion.  
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(3) Risk-free rate (rf) is the discount rate assumed to be riskless discount rate, on 
the basis of the U.S Treasury spot rate of return, with is maturity equivalent’s to 
the option’s time to maturity.  
(4) Volatility (σ) is the risk of the expected returns. The market risk has been 
eliminated by using a technology already implemented. However, there is a risk 
associated to the performance of the CSP plant, depending on the weather, the 
availability factor of the plant, variations in the price of labour or some 
commodities such as water for cleaning mirrors, etc. After simulations were run, 
a deviation of 30% was detected. Identically to the discount rate, a different value 
would require a different minimum grant, remaining the validity of the discussion. 
(5) Exercise price (of period) i (Xi) means the cost of undertaking the following 
stage. The project has been divided into 5 stages (being one year-long each of 
those) in which the company can decide whether to continue (exercising the 
option at price Xi) or abandon at current stage. The cost of each period is 
extracted from table, assuming Eurotrough 1 is undertaken in 1998, 1999 and 
2000 (being the same investment per year, although the period in 1998 is shorter) 
and Eurotrough 2 into 2001 and 2002.  
(6) Duration stage (Ti) is the length of each stage. It is assumed to be one year 
each, representing the company could abandon the project at the beginning of 
each new year.  
(7) Incremental step (δt) is each one of the discrete periods the model is divided.  
(8) u and d: are the RO parameters applied to the binomial tree according to 
(Kodukula et al. 2006) and (Hull 2009). So is the initial value of the asset, but in the 
first time increment, it either goes up or down and from there continues to go 
either up or down in the following time increments. The up and down movements 
are represented by u and d factors, where u>1 and d=1/u. The magnitude of 
these factors depends on the volatility of the underlying asset.   
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(9) p: is the risk-neutral probability that enables to uses the risk-free rate as 
discount rate.  
 
4.3. Scenario analysis 
With the use of the previous parameters, the NPV at 1998 of the R&D investment 
without any grant is 0.01 M€, which means a ROI of roughly 0%. This cash-flow 
has considered the five R&D investments in 1998-2002, three idle years (2003, 
2004 and 2005) and commercial cash-in (from table 2) in the period 2006-2013. 
The detailed cash-flow is in table 4. 
However, if the grant is considered, the previous NPV improves significantly. 
Using the grant given by the EC (50%) supposed to be in 1999 for Eurotrough I 
and 2002 for Eurotrough II –this assumption states the grant is received the 
following year after its concession; the NPV of the project increases up to 1.785 
M€ (ROI equals to 41%). The detailed cash-flow is in table 5. In this scenario, there 
is no way of introducing the loss of flexibility since the DCF does not allow to 
valuate it
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Table 4: Base case cash-flow. All figures in k€. 
 
 
1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 
 Eurotrough I  - 801  - 801  - 801                           
 Eurotrough II        - 997 - 997                       
 Grant                                
 Commercial revenues               243 953 1 297     1 398  3 344 2 703  136  1 013    
 Total  - 801  - 801  - 801 - 997 -  997  - - - 243 953 1 297     1 398  3 344  2 703  136  1 013   - 
discount rate: 10%                                
NPV (@1998)  14                                 
Total R&D investment - 4 396                                  
ROI 0%                                 
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Table 5: Grant case cash-flow. All figures in k€. 
 
 
1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 
 Eurotrough I  - 801  - 801  - 801                           
 Eurotrough II        - 997 - 997                       
 Grant     1 200     997                      
 Commercial revenues               243 953 1 297     1 398  3 344 2 703  136  1 013    
 Total  - 801  399  - 801 - 997 - - - - 243 953 1 297     1 398  3 344  2 703  136  1 013   - 
discount rate: 10%                                
NPV (@1998)  1 785                                 
Total R&D investment - 4 396                                  
ROI 41%                                 
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4.4. RO Model 
Finally, applying RO (without grants) implies building a binomial tree with the 
following results showed in table 6. This table is divided in seven sections: the first 
area indicates the theoretical value of the underlying asset, starting with S0 which 
is the NPV of the commercial revenues at 1998 and in each node the value can 
either go up by u or down by d. The second section is the nominal value of the 
underlying asset. Thirdly, the option value of stage 5 calculated following (Hull 
2009) by which final node equals to the maximum of the underlying asset value 
minus the exercise price or zero (if the exercise price is greater than the asset, the 
option value is zero because it is not executed). This last node does not account 
for the defer option, only for abandon since it is the last opportunity the company 
can exercise the option and therefore execute the R&D project. Therefore, the 
option value in the last node, for instance S0·u^6 would be max {S0·u^6– X5 ; 0}. 
All the terminal nodes are calculated the same way. 
Going backwards to intermediate nodes, at each step there is a comparison 
between exercising the option at that node and waiting for the next time step. In 
this case, for example the valuation of the node S0·u^5 would be [p·(S0·u^6) + 
(1-p)·(S0·u^5·d)] · exp (-r δt). 
Once all the option values for stage-5 have been calculated, in order to determine 
stage-4 option values, the same procedure applies but using as underlying asset 
the stage-5 option values. Once stage-4 is calculated, it is possible to compute 
stage-3 and so on until stage-1 is determined.  
Value of stage-1 at time zero is the real option value for the project.  
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Figure 2: Evolution of the underlying asset and real option value at each node 
 
GMB Doctoral Thesis   59/130 
Table 6: Evolution of the underlying asset and real option value at each time step 
 
Time step 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 
S0 S0·u So·u^2 S0·u^3 S0·u^4 So·u^5 S0·u^6 
  S0·d S0·u·d S0·u^2·d S0·u^3·d S0·u^4·d S0·u^5·d 
    S0·d^2 S0·u·d^2 S0·u^2·d^2 S0·u^3·d^2 S0·u^3·d^2 
      S0·d^3 S0·u·d^3 S0·u^2·d^3 S0·u^3·d^3 
        S0·d^4 S0·u·d^4 S0·u^2·d^4 
          S0·d^5 S0·u·d^5 
            S0·d^6 
Evolution of the underlying asset value [figures in k€] 
3 634 4 906 6 622 8 939 12 066 16 287 21 986 
  2 692 3 634 4 906 6 622 8 939 12 066 
    1 994 2 692 3 634 4 906 6 622 
      1 478 1 994 2 692 3 634 
        1 095 1 478 1 994 
          811 1 095 
            601 
Stage-5 option value [figures in k€] 
2 900 4 129 5 806 8 081 11 164 15 339 20 989 
  1 925 2 818 4 048 5 720 7 990 11 069 
    1 197 1 834 2 732 3 957 5 625 
      660 1 092 1 744 2 637 
        279 529 998 
          47 98 
            0 
Stage-4 option value [figures in k€] 
2198 3335 4948 7179 10216 14342  
  1245 2007 3146 4772 6994  
    583 1034 1784 2961  
      176 362 747  
        0 0  
          0  
Stage-3 option value [figures in k€] 
1 666 2 690 4 223 6 417 9 415 
  776 1 378 2 384 3 971 
    231 477 983 
      0 0 
        0 
Stage-2 option value [figures in k€] 
1 161 2 036 3 461 5 616 
  372 768 1 583 
    0 0 
      0 
Stage-1 option value [figures in k€] 
626 1 290 2 661 
  0 0 
    0 
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The value of further stages increase as the technical uncertainty is cleared, ie.: as 
we move forward in the stages.  In this RO analysis, the defer option is considered 
up to two years (the idle time between the original R&D project would finish in 
2002, and one year prior to the first commercial one which is 2006 ) plus the 
option to abandon at each node. The value with managerial flexibility is 0.626 M€ 
(ROI = 14%). 
Figure 3 shows the results: The horizontal line represents the RO value with the 
options to abandon and defer up to 2 years. The increasing one reflects the NPV 
as a function of the grants (expressed as the ratio between contribution and 
declared costs). The break-even grant that equals with the RO value is 17.25%. 
This means that grants below 17.25% are not beneficial for the company because 
the loss of flexibility is worth more than the financial incentive.  
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Figure 3: NPV as function of the received grant 
 
 
4.5. Varying the conditions 
There might be some variation to the base case. For instance, many funding 
agencies allow asking for a deferment of 1 year. In this case, the flexibility to 
analyse is not the abandon option plus 2-year defer option but abandon plus 1 
year. In this case, the minimum grant would be not 17.25% but 12.5%, using the 
same methodology. The option to abandon should stay in the analysis; otherwise 
the funding agency would not provide funds for the project.  Shorter or longer 




Whereas most of the literature has approached the evaluation of renewable 
energy policy (Yu et al. 2006; Boomsma et al. 2012; Lee et al. 2011; Lin et al. 2013; 
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Reuter et al. 2012; Monjas-Barroso et al. 2013; Zhang et al. 2014; Kumbaroğlu et al. 
2008) from a government or funding body perspective, we have focused on the 
point of view of the companies. These companies may accept or not a grant only 
if the financial incentive overcomes the flexibility barriers imposed, ie.: there is a 
break-even grant for the companies. Besides that, we have precisely located our 
research in the specific R&D management framework known as Stage-gate: 
whether the company should continue with the development, delay or simply 
abandon it (NREL 2014). One of the differences between our paper and literature 
on Stage-gate is that we have quantitatively assessed the value of abandon and 
defer option. To illustrate this idea, table 7 shows the project value under DCF 
with and without grants and ROA. 
Table 7: Project value for each case: DCF with and without grant and ROA 
 
Valuation technique  Grant? Project value 
DCF No 0.01 M€ 
DCF Yes 1.785 M€ 
ROA No 0.626 M€ 
 
The base case (DCF with no grant) has no value at all; the R&D investment would 
equal the commercial revenues for the project. However, if granted, the total NPV 
improves up to 1.785 M€. Nonetheless, this figure should not be taken as total 
improvement because DCF is not showing the drawback: the loss on flexibility 
which is worth 0.626 M€. Therefore, in this case, the grant should be accepted 
because is higher than the flexibility embedded in the project. Actually the net 
improvement to the project is not 1.785 M€ but 1.160 M€ (1.785 – 0.626). In this 
case, the break-even grant is 0.626 M€. If the project were granted, no matter if 
the analysis is performed with DCF or with ROA, since in absence of all flexibility, 
a typical RO approach behaves as a DCF technique (Martínez-Ceseña et al. 2011). 
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Literature on ROA has approached renewable energy projects on a commercial 
stage (Santos et al. 2014; Martínez-Ceseña et al. 2011; Amran et al. 1999; 
Fernandes et al. 2011; Faulkner 1996; Venetsanos et al. 2002; David et al. 2003; Fleten  
et al. 2004; Sarkis et al. 2008; Ashuri et al. 2011; Hedman et al. 2006; Zhang et al. 2005; 
Kjærland et al. 2010) whereas there are uncertainties which are both external; such 
as electricity prices, demand curve, wind speed, solar irradiation or water flow, 
and internal: mostly the design of the electricity generation plant. However, our 
approach simplifies those uncertainties (due to the use of an old R&D project in 
which the market share is already know, the price is calculated trough (Zúñiga et 
al. 2014) which already considers solar irradiation, performance of the plant, etc) 
to focus on the R&D management: the real options embedded in the R&D 
project. Moreover, comparing our work with the literature describing ROA versus 
DCF in R&D projects (Tsui 2005; Hodota 2006; Trang et al. 2002), we have consider 
a completely new option for a company: being able to lose some flexibility (and 
therefore control) over a project to get a financial incentive. 
  









Chapter V. Second case: The Public Institution 
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This case is a new perspective on the situation described in (Martín-Barrera et 
al. 2016), in which a company faced the dilemma of accepting or rejecting a grant 
to finance a R&D project. In that case, besides the financial benefit of the grant, 
the drawback was the reduction of flexibility imposed by the European 
Commission. Therefore, a minimum grant was required to compensate the value 
lost on flexibility. 
This new perspective raises a different approach, however: the recommendation 
will be aimed at the financing body rather than the companies. The purpose of 
this numerical case is to illustrate the maximum grant a financing body should 
offer to companies in order to accelerate their research, this value being lower 
than the 100% that may crowd out private investment.  
In other words, because there is a minimum grant above 0% companies should 
require, there must be a maximum grant below 100% financing bodies should not 
exceed.  
Although this case is based on a specific technology, the value of its presentation 
resides in the possibility of subsequently extrapolating the methodology to any 
other technology. The use of ROV is not Renewable Energy specific, but applicable 
to any R&D project undertaken by a private company or group of companies 
which presents flexibility. Furthermore, this case is not dependent on the 
European system of grants, but applies to any subsidy provided worldwide which 
provides an economic incentive to private companies while limiting flexibility in 
any way -setting a deadline, for example.  
In this section, we present the numerical case in which we compare the original 
investment the company made and the maximum equivalent grant given by a 
financing body (the European Commission in this case) that would have been 
necessary to accelerate the project by a couple of years. Subsequently, due to the 
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high sensitivity of certain parameters, a further analysis is undertaken under 
different assumptions. 
As previously mentioned, the choice of an old project is intentional for two main 
reasons: (a) The main difference in using an ongoing project would be the need 
to project the total market and the corresponding market share captured by the 
R&D project results. This would complicate the analysis by adding more 
uncertainty to the calculations and deviating attention from the ROV. The 
significant advantage of using old technology is that all the potential revenues of 
the project are perfectly defined. Furthermore, (b) this case was presented by 
Martín-Barrera et al. (Martín-Barrera et al. 2016) from the company’s point of 
view. By using the same case, this analysis complements the previous one by 
adding the funding body’s perspective. Thus the full analysis is performed and 
determines on the one hand the minimum grant a company should accept and 
on the other, the maximum grant a funding body should offer.  
 
5.1 Project description 
This project describes the development of a new component for Concentrated 
Solar Energy (CSP). This technology complements the traditional Photovoltaics 
(PV) using the Sun as source of energy. Together, there could be more than 400 
GW of electrical capacity installed by 2035, according to the International Energy 
Agency (IEA) (IEA 2008). CSP is divided into two technologies: tower and troughts; 
however, both are based on the same principle which is to concentrate sunlight 
using mirrors and produce heat to drive a steam turbine. The tower uses trackers 
that follow the sun and concentrate light onto a solar receiver on the top of the 
tower. The trough (or parabolic trough) consists of a linear parabolic reflector that 
concentrates light onto a receiver positioned along the reflector’s focal line 
(European Solar Thermal Electricity Association 2014). 
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This R&D project seeks the development of a new 150-metre-long trough as 
opposed to the former 100 metre LS-3 used by its competitors. Besides the 
economies of scale provided by a larger component, this tracker has a lighter 
design that reduces operation and maintenance costs due to easier mirror 
cleaning, and fewer components. The R&D project name was ‘Eurotrough’, and it 
was  carried out by a consortium of companies in the late 1990s (Ciemat et al. 
2014). Eurotrough received two different grants from the European Commission 
(EC) called Eurotrough I and Eurotrough II. The below table describes the start 
and end dates, the cost declared by the consortium, and the grant received from 
the EC called the EU contribution. 
Table 8: Eurotrough I & II Start and End Dates, Declared Costs and EU Contribution 
Contract Start Date End Date Total Declared 
Costs 
EU Contribution 
Eurotrough I 1-Ago-98 31-Jan-01 2 402 514 € 1 199 899 € 
Eurotrough II 1-Oct-00 31-Dec-02 1 993 707 € 996 851 € 
 
The project started in August 1998 with a grant of approximately 50% of the total 
declared cost. The question is: how much grant money would have been 
necessary to bring forward the investment by two years, i.e., to 1996? Of course, 
a 100% grant will always incentivise companies, but we argue that this is not the 
optimal funding rate.  
 
5.2 Parameter estimation 
 Although CSP plants are large, complex installations with hundreds of design 
parameters (European Solar Thermal Electricity Association 2014), there are two 
particularly important aspects that roughly determine the size and cost: the 
nominal output, which defines the size of the steam turbine, and the storage 
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capacity, expressed as the number of hours the plant is able to work at full load 
with no sun. The higher any of these two parameters is, the larger the solar field 
is. A larger solar field positively impacts on the benefits of using more efficient 
trackers since the benefit is multiplied more times over.  
The improvement of the new trough over the previous one is clearly described in 
(Martín-Barrera et al. 2016), in which different locations were simulated using 
incremental storage hours. The results are given in figure 1 of the previous 
chapter which shows the incremental NPV per hour of storage, normalised to 
electrical megawatt (MWe) of installed capacity. 
With these results, determining the market revenues of the technology is 
straightforward because all the commercial power plants that use this technology 
are already known and no new plants will be built using that technology. The fact 
of using an old R&D projects helps to determine the exact market revenues. If the 
project were online, these revenues should be estimation based on market share 
projections. 
NREL (NREL 2014) details all the commercial power plants using Eurotrough 
worldwide, combining the list (which details electrical capacity and number of 
storage hours) and the increments in NPV per MWe and storage hour given in 
figure 1. The total NPV due to technology at the beginning of each year is shown 
in the below table. 
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Table 9: NPV of commercial revenues using Eurotrough rather than LS3 discounted at indicated year  
 
Year Commercial revenue of R&D project 
2006 243 159.55 € 
2007 952 284.55 € 
2008 1 296 778.64 € 
2009 1 398 113.19 € 
2010 3 343 509.25 € 
2011 2 703 466.25 € 
2012 136 322.02 € 
2013 1 013 243.07 € 
Total 11 086 876.50 € 
 
to assess the value of flexibility embedded in the project, the necessary 
parameters for the use of ROV are defined in the following table and explained 
here. 
  
GMB Doctoral Thesis   70/130 
Table 10: Value of the parameters for the binomial tree of the original case (investment in 1998) 
 
Parameter Value 
(1) Stock price S0 3 634 194.92 € 
(2) Discount rate r 10% 
(3) Risk-free rate rf 5% 
(4) Volatility σ 30% 
(5) Exercise price 1 X1 808 838.00 € 
(5) Exercise price 2 X2 808 838.00 € 
(5) Exercise price 3 X3 808 838.00 € 
(5) Exercise price 4 X4 996 853.50 € 
(5) Exercise price 5 X5 996 853.50 € 
(6) Duration stage-1 T1 1 
(6) Duration stage-2 T2 1 
(6) Duration stage-3 T3 1 
(6) Duration stage-4 T4 1 
(6) Duration stage-5 T5 1 
(7) Incremental time step δt 1 
(8) u = exp (σ√δt) 1.34986 
(8) d = 1/u 0.7408 
(9) p = (exp (rfδt) – d)/(u-d) 0.5097 
  
(1) S0 is the value of the underlying asset, calculated by discounting to 1998 all of 
the NPV of every single CSP plant using Eurotrough built worldwide from table 2. 
(2) Discount rate (r) is the opportunity cost of the company undertaking the 
investment.  There is a sensitivity analysis based on discount rate for being one 
of the parameters that mostly affects the results.  
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(3) Risk-free rate (rf) is the discount rate assumed to be the riskless discount rate 
on the basis of the U.S. Treasury spot rate of return, with maturity equivalent to 
the option’s time to maturity. 
(4) Volatility (σ) is the risk of the expected returns. The market risk has been 
eliminated using a technology that has been already implemented. There is a risk 
associated with the performance of the CSP plant, however, depending on the 
weather, the availability factor of the plant, variations in the price of labour or 
certain commodities, such as water for cleaning mirrors. In this case, a volatility of 
30% is determined. Nonetheless, there is also a sensitivity analysis of the volatility.  
(5) Exercise price of period i (Xi) means the cost of undertaking stage i. The R&D 
project has been divided into 5 stages (each being one year) in which the 
company can decide whether to continue (exercising the option at price Xi) or 
abandon at the current stage. The cost of each period is extracted from table 1, 
assuming Eurotrough I is undertaken in 1998, 1999 and 2000 (with the same 
investment each year, although the period in 1998 is shorter), and Eurotrough II 
is undertaken in 2001 and 2002. 
(6) Duration stage (Ti) is the length of each stage. It is assumed to be one year, 
indicating that the company could abandon the project at the beginning of each 
year following the stage gate approach (Cooper et al. 2018). 
(7) Incremental step (δt) is the discrete periods into which the model is divided. 
In this case, the step is one year. 
(8) u and d are the RO parameters applied to the binomial tree according to 
(Kodukula et al. 2006) y (Hull 2009). S0 is the initial value of the asset, but in the 
first time increment, it could either go up or down and from there continues to 
go either up or down in the following time steps. The up and down movements 
are represented by u and d factors, where u>1 and d=1/u. The magnitude of 
these factors depends on the volatility of the underlying asset. 
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(9) p is the risk-neutral probability, which makes it possible to use the risk-free 
rate as a discount rate according to (Kodukula et al. 2006; Hull 2009). 
 
5.3 Scenario analysis 
 In this section, the objective is to compare the original investment (1998 with 
50% grant) with different volatility and risk scenarios in 1996 if the EC had tried 
to boost the investment. 
 
5.3.1 Original investment in 1998 
The original investment was decided in 1998. At that time, with the costs of table 
1, the revenues from table 2 and the discount rate from table 3, the NPV of the 
project was nearly zero. Due to the positive effect of the grant, however, the NPV 
rose to 1.79 M Eur., meaning a ROI of approximately 40%. The detailed cash flow 
is included in Table 4. 
In (Martín-Barrera et al. 2016), there was a study of the positive financial effects 
of the grant versus the obligations imposed by signing a contract with the EC to 
develop the project. In fact, a minimum grant of 17.25% was determined as the 
break-even point between the improvements due to the EC contributions minus 
the value lost because of the lack of flexibility.  
 
5.3.2. What would be the required grant to bring the project forward to 1996? 
According to Brown et al. (Brown et al. 2012), because R&D knowledge spills 
across firms and even countries, suggesting that socially optimal rates of R&D are 
likely to be much higher than privately optimal levels, R&D faces financing 
constraints such that its private investment may be below the optimal level. In 
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Europe, there are funds to finance sustainable energy projects to overcome 
market failures (Streimikiene 2005). 
For any funding body, and for society in general, it is advantageous to research 
and develop new technologies as soon as possible to boost the technological 
potential of the country and help its economic growth.  
The further from the market a new idea is, however, the riskier for the promoter. 
From this point forward, we will assume that even the EC wants the consortium 
to develop Eurotrough a few years earlier; the first commercial plant is still built 
in 2006. This assumption is the most negative for the company because revenues 
are received much later than the investment. However, we have decided to 
explore only the EC initiative to bring the inversion forward to 1996, without any 
side benefits, such as receiving revenues sooner. By doing so, the task is only 
focused on the grant. It is reasonable to think that the sooner the R&D project is 
finished; the sooner a new commercial power plant will be built. Therefore, if the 
R&D project had been performed in 1996, the first commercial power plant could 
have been built before 2006. This idea will be explored in greater detail at a later 
point.  
The selection of 2 years is considered reasonable because a 1-year period has a 
moderate effect and 3 or more years have a deep impact on the parameter 
estimation because a much higher volatility applies. It is unlikely that companies 
could start much earlier than 2 years simply due to the state of the art. 
With these values, the NPV in 1996 with everything else equal (see cash-flow in 
table 5) would be 1.16 M Eur. This assumption is not realistic, however, as there 
is a higher risk involved because the new trough is being developed 2 years 
earlier.  
To better model the investment in 1996, the discount risk should be higher. A 
reasonable figure is 13%, although sensitivity analyses are performed in this 
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paper. In this case, the NPV drops to 0.32 M Eur. This means it is highly unlikely 
any private company would continue with the project so early on.  
Therefore, any funding body willing to accelerate the R&D would need to increase 
the grant so that it equals the higher risk companies are facing.  
With regard to Research projects (further from market, higher risk), typically there 
are grants that cover up to 100% of the costs. If this were the case, the NPV would 
be 1.99 M Eur with the adjusted discount rate of 13%. This figure is even higher 
than the original of 1.79 M Eur the company had in 1998. 
By fine-tuning the incentive to equal the NPV of 1998, a grant of 94% would be 
required. As will be discussed in the following section, however, very high 
incentives are not optimal. 
 
5.4 RO model 
In the previous sections, the value associated with the flexibility of the project has 
not been taken into account. This flexibility will impact the required grant. 
In (Martín-Barrera et al. 2016), the flexibility of the project was calculated in 1998, 
using the same parameters as shown in table 3. That case sought the equilibrium 
between grants and the loss of flexibility imposed. The main flexibility of an R&D 
project is split into two potential actions managers can take, as stated above: i) 
delay the development of the project until more information about the market 
and the potential profitability is gathered, and ii) abandon the R&D project if it is 
not profitable.  
Because this case faces new characteristics, it is necessary to update some of the 
RO parameters of table 3. The updated parameters are redefined in table 6. 
(1) Stock Price S0: the new value is lower than the original because the net present 
value is not at 1998 but at 1996, applying a higher discount rate. 
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(2) Discount rate r: as discussed in the previous section, a higher discount rate 
must be applied because the decision to initiate the project is taken 2 years 
earlier.  
(4) Volatility σ: similar to the discount rate, having up to two extra years induces 
a higher volatility to the system. Volatility has been escalated according to the 
discount rate.  
(6) Duration stage-1 T1: this value increases to 3, the original one-year value plus 
the two additional years. 
(8) & (9) u, d and p: these values are calculated directly from the previous ones. 
To calculate ROV (without grants) and for the purpose of simplicity, a binomial 
tree is built, with the results shown in the following table.
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Table 11: Evolution of the underlying asset and real option value at each time step 
 
TTTime step 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
 S0 S0·u S0·u^2 S0·u^3 S0·u^4 S0·u^5 S0·u^6 S0·u^7 S0·u^8 
  S0·d S0·u·d S0·u^2·d S0·u^3·d S0·u^4·d S0·u^5·d S0·u^6·d S0·u^7·d 
   S0·d^2 S0·u·d^2 S0·u^2·d^2 S0·u^3·d^2 S0·u^4·d^2 S0·u^5·d^2 S0·u^6·d^2 
    S0·d^3 S0·u·d^3 S0·u^2·d^3 S0·u^3·d^3 S0·u^4·d^3 S0·u^5·d^3 
     S0·d^4 S0·u·d^4 S0·u^2·d^4 S0·u^3·d^4 S0·u^4·d^4  
      S0·d^5 S0·u·d^4 S0·u^2·d^5 S0·u^3·d^5 
       S0·d^6 S0·u·d^6 S0·u^2·d^6 
        S0·d^7 S0·u·d^7 
         S0·d^8 
Evolution of the underlying asset value [figures in k€] 
 2 087  3 113  4 645  6 929  10 337  15 421  23 006  34 320  51 200  
  1 399  2 087  3 113  4 645  6 929  10 337  15 421  23 006  
    938  1 399  2 087  3 113  4 645  6 929  10 337  
     629   938  1 399  2 087  3 113  4 645  
      421   629   938  1 399  2 087  
       282   421   629   938  
        189   282   421  
         127   189  
          85  
Stage-5 option value [figures in k€] 
 1 514  2 458  3 922  6 155  9 521  14 563  22 104  33 372  50 203  
    842  1 427  2 366  3 833  6 071  9 435  14 473  22 009  
      416   752  1 324  2 263  3 743  5 981  9 340  
        166   329   638  1 200  2 165  3 648  
          41   94   212   481  1 090  
           - - - - 
             - - - 
               - - 
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                 - 
Stage-4 option value [figures in k€]  
 1 120  1 930  3 257  5 374  8 663  13 661  21 155  32 375   
    527   967  1 738  3 043  5 169  8 487  13 476   
      196   393   776  1 496  2 795  4 984   
        44   100   227   515  1 168   
         - - - -  
           - - -  
             - -  
               -  
Stage-3 option value [figures in k€]  
  837  1 527  2 722  4 722  7 938  12 899  20 355    
    321   640  1 253  2 393  4 407  7 686    
      75   171   388   879  1 994      
        -  - - -     
         - - -     
           - -     
             -     
Stage-2 option value [figures in k€]    
  568  1 114  2 139  3 998  7 177  12 099     
    150   333   737  1 631  3 607     
      7   15   35   79     
    - - -    
     - -    
      -    
Stage-1 option value [figures in k€]     
  387   794  1 614  3 236  6 376      
    71   162   366   830      
     - - -     
       - -     
     -     
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This table is divided into seven sections: the upper area indicates the theoretical 
value of the underlying asset, starting with S0, which is the NPV of the commercial 
revenues at 1996 (the original was calculated until 1998); in each node, the value 
can either go up by u or down by d. The second area is the nominal value of the 
underlying asset. The third area is the option value of stage-5 calculated following 
47], by which the final node equals the maximum of the underlying asset value 
minus the exercise price or zero (if the exercise price is greater than the asset, the 
option value is zero because it is not executed). This last node does not account 
for the defer option, only for abandon because it is the company’s final 
opportunity to exercise the option and therefore execute the R&D project. 
Therefore, the option value in the last node, for instance S0·u8, would be max 
{S0·u8– X5; 0}. All of the terminal nodes are calculated identically. Working 
backwards to the intermediate nodes, at each step, there is a comparison between 
exercising the option at that node and waiting for the next time step. In this case, 
for example, the valuation of the node S0·u7 would be [p·(S0·u8)+(1-
p)·(S0·u7·d)]·exp(-r δt). 
Once all of the option values for stage-5 have been calculated, the same 
procedure applies to calculate further stages in which the previous option is the 
underlying asset of the lower stage. For instance, stage-4 will use stage-5 option 
value as underlying asset. The value of stage-1 at time zero is the real option value 
for the project. 
The value of higher stages increases as the technical uncertainty is cleared, i.e., as 
we move forward in the stages the R&D results are clearer as the probability of 
success is higher. In this RO analysis, the defer option is considered for up to four 
years (the period between 1996 and 1998, plus 2-year idle time - 2003 and 2004 
–, after the R&D project is finished in 2002 and before the first power plant starts 
construction) plus the option to abandon at each node. The value of managerial 
flexibility is 0.387 M€. 
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The difference in the value obtained in this project, compared to the original 1998 
starting point, which is 0.626 M€ (Martín-Barrera et al. 2016), is due to the higher 
discount rate and the two extra periods the underlying asset has been discounted.  
 
5.5 Sensitivity analysis 
The scenario so far has been conservative regarding the parameters. Due to the 
high impact of both the volatility and the discount rate on the equivalent grant, 
however, it is necessary to further explore the impact. Therefore, a sensitivity 
analysis is performed in this section in order to fully understand the implications.  
 
5.5.1 Sensitivity analysis: discount rate 
The discount rate is the most sensitive parameter of the model. Table 12 shows 
the results using the following notation: 
gr’: is the grant required in 1996 to equal the NPV in 1998 with a 50% grant. This 
value does not consider flexibility and assumes the first commercial power plant 
will still open in 2006 and that the volatility is 40%. 
ROV (σ=40%): is the Real Option Value (i.e., the flexibility value) depending on the 
discount rate. The calculations are the same as described in the previous section 
and tables. The great difference is due to the value of the underlying asset S0 
discounted at different rates. The lower the rate, the higher the initial value and 
therefore the higher the ROV.  
gr’’: this is the grant required in 1996 to equal the NPV in 1998 with a 50% grant 
including the ROV; therefore, a lower grant is needed.  
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Table 12: Sensitivity analysis of the Discount Rate 
 
Discount Rate gr’ ROV 
(σ=40%) 
gr’’ Difference 
10% 68%  890.109 €  43% 25% 
11% 77%  693.771 €  57% 20% 
12% 86%  528.286 €  70% 16% 
13% 94%  386.768 €  82% 12% 
14% 101%  275.990 €  92% 9% 
15% 107%  184.770 €  102% 5% 
 
 In conclusion, the required grant increases almost 12% per each 1% increase in 
the discount rate.  
 
5.5.2 Sensitivity analysis: volatility 
The volatility impact, however, is lower than the discount rate. Using a similar 
notation as before:  
gσ’: the grant required in 1996 to equal the NPV in 1998 with a 50% grant, 
assuming the discount rate is 10% in 1998 but in 13% in 1996. Because volatility 
only affects ROV and this value already includes flexibility in the analysis, the value 
is the same regardless of the change in σ. 
ROV (r=13%): Real Option Value (i.e., the value of the flexibility) depending on 
the volatility using a discount rate of 13%. The higher the volatility, the greater 
the flexibility value and therefore the ROV.  
gσ’’: the grant required in 1996 to equal the NPV in 1998 with a 50% grant, 
including the value of flexibility. As stated before, the effect is lower compared to 
the discount rate.  
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In conclusion, the required grant decreases 6% per 10% increase in volatility, as 
this table shows.  
Table 13: Sensitivity analysis of the Volatility 
 
σ gσ’ ROV(r=13%) gσ’’ Difference 
30% 94%  180.446 €  88% 6% 
40% 94%  386.768 €  82% 12% 
50% 94%  585.338 €  76% 18% 
 
5.3.2 What if the first commercial plant were built sooner? 
Although up to this point it has been assumed that the first commercial power 
plant was still built in 2006, if the R&D project began in 1996 rather than 1998, it 
is not unreasonable to assume that the first commercial power plant including 
this new component would have been built in 2004 and not in 2006. 
Assuming a discount rate of 13% and volatility equals 40% (same values as the 
base case), the NPV in 1996 would have been 0.90 M€ and the ROV = 0.387 M€. 
This flexibility value is close to the original case because there are two factors in 
this value: 
- A positive effect of S0 because it is discounted from 2004 rather than 2006; 
therefore, the initial value is greater. 
- A negative effect because the time to exercise the options is decreased by two 
years.  
In this particular case (r=13%, σ=40%), there seems to be a balance between the 
two factors.  
Obviously, if the model were calculated with r=10% and σ=40%, the ROV would 
be exactly the same as the original case in 1998 because the flexibility would have 
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been the same. These results show there is little correlation between the required 
grant and the commercial power plant being built earlier. Therefore, it is safe to 
continue using the 2006-year with no major impact on the calculations.  
 
5.6 Combining parameters 
The previous sub-sections have performed a sensitivity analysis based on two 
individual parameters, the discount rate and the volatility. For the sake of 
providing a complete overview, however, this section compares three different 
scenarios. 
The notation is the same as before: g’ is the required grant in each scenario to 
equal the NPV in 1998 with 50% grant. After valuing the flexibility, the new 
required grant g’’ is lower. The results are shown in the below table. 







g’ ROV g’’ 
Base r = 13% σ = 40% 2006 94% 386.768 € 82% 
Optimistic r = 10% σ = 50% 2004 50% 1.100.156 € 19% 
Pessimistic r = 15% σ = 30% 2006 107% 83.457 € 105% 
 
The main takeaway of this section is that the great value associated with flexibility 
depends on the discount rate; to a lesser degree, on volatility; and finally, on the 
commercial year. This finding creates no new problems with valuing R&D 
projects, however, as the discount rate is also the main factor in any conventional 
DCF (Brealey et al. 2008).  
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5.7 Discussion 
The case presented is a real case undertaken by a consortium of private 
companies that decided to start an R&D project in 1998 with a certain amount of 
grant funding (50% of the total cost). This facilitated a minimum NPV in the 
investment, taking into account the uncertainties associated with any R&D 
project, namely technical success and market demand.  
According to the market estimations and the expected NPV presented in (Martín-
Barrera et al. 2016), the project would be undertaken only with a grant because 
the NPV without any grant was close to zero. This grant helps companies to 
overcome market inefficiencies regarding R&D (Streimikiene et al. 2007; Pennings 
et al. 1997). 
If the financing body, for instance the EC, wanted to incentivise the companies to 
start the project earlier, however, thus bringing forward the commercial plant and 
eventually increasing competitiveness, a larger grant would be necessary to 
balance the higher risks borne by the companies.  
To equal the NPV of 1998 in 1996, the grant would need to be not 50% but 94%.1 
This creates two drawbacks:  
a) Clearly, it is a very expensive measure and it would not be possible to bring the 
project forward more than a couple of years. Almost duplicating the grant would 
mean that half of the companies would be able to receive incentives.  
b) The closer a grant is to 100%, the higher the risk of projects with less 
commercial prospects going forward. For instance, a large R&D company or an 
R&D centre with no real commercial interest could apply for the grant for the 
sake of keeping their employees busy while covering structural costs. If there is 
no real risk for the company and consequently no commitment on the company’s 
                                                          
1 94% in the base case, Subsection 4.3.4.1 performed a sensitivity analysis and this grant could be a 
slightly lower or even greater. The rationale of the discussion remains the same.  
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part, it is difficult to estimate whether the project has any feasible expected 
profitability.  
The previous drawbacks are based on a non-flexibility scenario. As discussed 
earlier, however, the company has the option to defer the development as well as 
to abandon the project if the estimations are not promising. Including the value 
of the flexibility given by the results in table 7, the grant can be lowered. In fact, 
from the required 94% to equal the NPV in 1996 at a higher discount rate, an 
equivalent grant of 82% can be offered. The difference between 94% and 82% is 
precisely the value of the flexibility. As previously stated, this value is based on a 
very conservative scenario and is subject to reduction as the flexibility increases. 
Some findings regarding this statement are as follows: 
i) If the R&D project starts earlier, it is reasonable to assume the first commercial 
power plant will also be built earlier. This effect would increase the value of the 
underlying asset, as subsection 4.3.4.3 showed (albeit with a moderate effect).  
ii) If the above reasoning were not true, this would mean the project has a higher 
volatility value than the one used in the numerical case. A higher volatility means 
a greater ROV and a lower required grant in 1996. Subsection 4.3.4.2 determined 
a reduction of 6% in the required grant for every 10% increase in volatility. In fact, 
this relationship would be greater if the project’s start date was advanced by more 
than 2 years because the impact of the volatility is increased with the length of 
the options. 
iii) If neither i) nor ii) were true, it would mean the risk is not so high, and therefore, 
the discount rate would also decrease. In this case, similar to i), the underlying 
asset value would not only increase but would be boosted. Subsection 4.3.4.1 
determined a reduction of 12% in the required grant per 1% decrease in the 
discount rate.  
  











Chapter VI. Conclusions 
 
Flexibility allows some of the uncertainty to be resolved before irreversible 
expenditures are made, enabling managers to make decisions that bring their 
operations closer to maximizing profits 
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The current paradigm in the valuation and assessment of R&D projects has 
been questioned because their level of flexibility and embedded options. Several 
studies have demonstrated how ROA should be applied in this kind of projects, 
developing appropriated frameworks to evaluate projects of different R&D areas. 
The uncertainty of R&D projects, the spillover benefits R&D expenditures provide 
to society and the increased risk and reduced cost of capital have justified 
governments implement public policies to subsidy, and ROA has been used for 
evaluation of subsidy schemes of several countries. But obtaining public funding 
imposes loss of flexibility in the management of its projects for companies once 
a grant is awarded. These restrictions have to be considered in assessment of 
projects and policies. Moreover, one of the most debated question in the 
literature has been if public incentives stimulate (crowding-in) or reduce private 
investment (crowding-out). This work presents the implications in assessment of 
these restrictions for companies and governments in two empirical studies for the 
same project but with different perspectives, using ROA. 
The first case (chapter 4) proved not any subsidy should be enough for private 
companies. On the one hand, grants improve cash-flow via incomes during the 
R&D investment period. On the other, they reduce the total value of the R&D 
project because of the stated limitations. The value added to a project by a grant 
is significantly lower than its nominal amount due to the loss of flexibility for the 
manager. In this case, stage-gate is useless because flexibility, which has proved 
to represent a significant share of the project (Santos et al. 2014; Martínez-Ceseña 
et al. 2011; Davis et al. 2003), is non-existent. Therefore, a minimum acceptable grant 
(a break-even point) that equals the loss in flexibility has been calculated. If some 
options are included in the incentive program, there will be less lost value due to 
inflexibility and a greater minimum grant acceptable. So, flexible grant schemes 
could provide higher value for companies, although the economic subsidies 
would be lower. The analysis framework used in ROA has to include the options 
restrictions because of the government grant; this provides a more accurate 
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project value. On the contrary to NPV, in which any additional income will always 
improve the valuation of the project, the reality is that grants below a threshold 
imply a loss of value for the investment, as they impose certain constrains limiting 
the company managerial flexibility. Companies need to balance on one hand the 
additional income due to the grant and on the other the limitations imposed 
(such as setting a deadline, not allowing to abandon the project so the investment 
is irreversible, discarding switching to alternative technologies, etc.) and realize 
the underlying value on flexibility could be much greater that the incentive. 
When a policy R&D incentive is designed, it should be recognized that financial 
terms are considered by companies facing an R&D investment as well as side 
effects such as the flexibility permitted during development. Some works analyse 
policy evaluation models from the perspective of governments and investors 
(Zhang et al. 2014). However, this approach will be useful to policy makers 
defining new public R&D financing policies because it provides a new way to 
quantify a concern faced by many companies. A new variable has been added to 
the debate regarding whether public R&D financing crowds-in or crowds-out 
private spending: the flexibility of the grant scheme. This new idea adds to the 
current literature and offers tools for policy makers that will help shape a more 
complete public R&D policy.  
For these reasons, the second case (chapter 5) set the focus on the rationale for 
public institutions. They should incentive the promotion of R&D projects but 
without displacing (ie. crowding-out) the private investment. Then, rather than 
providing very large grants which also presents other drawbacks such as free-
riders; public institutions could think about alternative schemes with a lower grant 
but with much more flexibility. Thus, this new grant scheme could be equally 
attractive for private companies although the nominal grant is substantially lower.  
Grants can be divided in two terms: the well-known financial incentive, the only 
one used to date; and a new term, the freedom given to companies. This freedom, 
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namely flexibility, enhances the R&D project because companies do have 
different options over the course of the project such as abandoning the project 
at any time if the technical or economic feasibility is not clear; deferring 
development until the market demand or some technical barriers are clarified; 
switching to a more promising technology, and so on. This flexibility has been 
quantified using Real Options Valuation in order to determine the reduction in 
the grant size. This work has proved it is equally attractive for companies to have 
a traditional high (in monetary terms) grant that is very restrictive with almost no 
flexibility at all or the new paradigm of a lower grant with embedded options, for 
instance, the opportunity to abandon the project at any time or defer the project 
several years. This finding helps to contribute the existing debate regarding the 
size of the grant and its crowing-out effect. It seems reasonable to argued that a 
lower grant that shares the risk with private companies brings some advantages: 
(i) Because the grant is smaller, the funding body can reach more projects 
and companies with the same budget, facilitating long-term stability in 
public R&D funding policy that is less dependent on yearly national 
budgets.  
(ii) Companies could be more sincere and honest with the outcomes of 
R&D projects. Currently, abandoning a R&D project has two immediate 
consequences: returning the incentive received and reducing the 
probability of receiving public money in the future due to the reputation 
loss. Because there is an information asymmetry between the private 
company and the funding body, current grant schemes encourage the 
temptation not to abandon certain R&D failures in order not to harm the 
firm’s ability to be awarded grants in the future.  
(iii) As stated above, the lower the grant is, the less crowding-out effect it 
represents. According to the literature, the crowding-out effect appears to 
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be correlated with large grants. Therefore, lower grants are less likely to 
negatively displace private R&D investment.  
(iv) Finally, the risk-sharing profile obliges companies to be selective with 
truly feasible R&D projects. Schemes in which financing reaches 100% of 
the investment may incentivise free-riders whose sole goal is to receive 
grants to maintain R&D structures without any real commercial potential.  
This second study has presented two scenarios a funding body may face at any 
time: on the one hand, reducing the nominal grant but awarding it in the same 
year, and on the other, deciphering the impact of awarding the grant earlier when 
the company faces higher risk in alignment with the goal of bringing knowledge 
to society sooner without bearing all the cost of the R&D project. After the 
calculations, a sensibility analysis over the design parameters of R&D activity was 
performed proving that Real Options Valuation, as DCF, is mostly affected by the 
discount rate, so no new significant variables are introduced to the valuation. 
Other parameters such as volatility have a much lower impact on the equivalent 
grant calculation.  
In summary, this doctoral thesis has proven the following statements: 
• NPV techniques are not valid for R&D project valuation under grant 
schemes.  
• Companies should require a grant above a minimum threshold to balance 
the loss of flexibility imposed by the grant requirements. 
• Public institutions should never provide 100% grants; but lower and more 
flexible incentives which are equally attractive for companies.  
• Then, there is an optimal balance between 0% and 100% that will depend 
on how mature is the project and therefore the managerial flexibility still 
embedded. 
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Further research could be done in at least two areas: the first one would be to 
increase the number of RO included in the evaluation of the flexibility. Besides 
abandon and defer options, there are others such as switch technology that could 
be suitable to different markets, or increase resources allocated to foster the 
research and gain market share, both to better adapt the project to market 
circumstances. The more options included in the analysis, the greater added value 
due to flexibility and the greater minimum grant acceptable. However, new 
flexible grant schemes could provide higher value to companies, although the 
economic help were lower. This is exactly what this paper should provide to policy 
makers, create awareness that not only the financial terms are considered by 
companies when facing an R&D investment, but side effects such as the flexibility 
allowed during the development. In this sense, an even further research would be 
to include real option “in” projects, not “on” projects. RO “in” projects mean to 
model not only actions that managers have, but also concerns design features 
built into the project. 
For the public institution, this work is not suggesting that reducing grants is an 
always desired action for all funding bodies, as there are other side-effects not 
analyzed here. One of the main drawbacks could be a bias towards very mature 
R&D projects with clear market perspectives, thus neglecting funding for research 
projects on large temporary horizons due to the inherently higher risk.  
Finally, the future is wide open for this field of research, including more 
personalized analysis to several types of projects depending on its matureness. 
However, the main achievement, if any, of this doctoral thesis is to create 
awareness of the flaws of NPV to assess R&D projects whereas Real Option 
Valuation is the most natural tool to fully valuate these plans, not yet assets. 
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Appendix III 
 
Each of the two cases of this doctoral thesis correspond to manuscripts that have 
been published in “Renewable and Sustainable Energy Reviews” (RSER) (Elsevier), 
a top-5 journal in its area. RSER is ranked #1 under “Sustainable Energy” by 
Google Scholar according to h5 index, it is also ranked in the 96th percentile of 
Renewable Energy, Sustainability and the Environment according to CiteScore, 
(#5 out of 117 journals) and have been in the Quartile 1 (Q1) since 2002 according 
to SJR. Appendix I presents the first paper published and Appendix II the 
correspondent second one. Besides this, the first article has already been cited 
twice without double-counting the reference in the second article. 
 
JCR Impact Factor & Ranking 
Source: http://journalinsights.elsevier.com/journals/1364-0321 
The Journal Impact Factor is published each year by Thomson Reuters. It is a 
measure of the number of times an average paper in a particular journal is cited 
during the preceding two years. 
For example: 
A = the number of times articles published in a specific journal in 2009 and 2010 
were cited by journals during 2011. 
B = the total number of 'citable items' published by that journal in 2009 and 2010. 
('Citable items' are usually articles, reviews, proceedings, etc.; not editorials or 
letters-to-the-editor.) 
2011 impact factor = A/B. 
ISI ranking 
Journals are often ranked by Impact Factor in an appropriate Thomson Reuters 
subject category. As there are now two Impact Factors published – two-year and 
five-year Impact Factors – this rank may differ, so care is needed when assessing 
these ranked lists to understand which of the two metrics is being used. In 
addition, journals can be categorized in multiple subject categories, giving them 
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different ranks for each subject. Consequently, a rank should always be in context 
to the subject category.  
 
Figure 4: Impact Factor of the journal 
 
Figure 5: Ranking of the journal 
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Figure 6: 5-year impact factor of the journal 
 
Figure 7: 5-year ranking of the journal 
 
SJR and Quartile 
Source: http://www.scimagojr.com/journalsearch.php?q=27567&tip=sid&clean=0 
The SJR is a size-independent prestige indicator that ranks journals by their 
'average prestige per article'. It is based on the idea that 'all citations are not 
created equal'. SJR is a measure of scientific influence of journals that accounts 
for both the number of citations received by a journal and the importance or 
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prestige of the journals where such citations come from It measures the scientific 
influence of the average article in a journal, it expresses how central to the global 
scientific discussion an average article of the journal is. 
The set of journals have been ranked according to their SJR and divided into four 
equal groups, four quartiles. Q1 (green) comprises the quarter of the journals with 
the highest values, Q2 (yellow) the second highest values, Q3 (orange) the third 
highest values and Q4 (red) the lowest values. 
 
Year SJR Year SJR 
2006 0.954 2011 3.005 
2007 2.135 2012 2.927 
2008 2.632 2013 3.213 
2009 2.653 2014 3.272 
2010 2.476 2015 3.120 
Table 15: SJR of RSER since 2006 
 
 
Figure 8: RSER SJR since 1999 
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Figure 9: RSER in Q1 since 2002 
 




According to Google Scholar, h5-index is the h-index for articles published in the 
last 5 complete years. It is the largest number h such that h articles published in 
2011-2015 have at least h citations each and h5-median for a publication is the 
median number of citations for the articles that make up its h5-index. 
According to this index, RSER is ranked #1 under Sustainable Energy. 
 
 
Figure 10: Google Scholar metrics 
 
 
Figure 11: RSER is ranked #1 under Sustainable Energy by Google Scholar according to h5 index 
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Figure 12: RSER is ranked #11 under Engineering and Computer Science by Google Scholar 
according to h5 index 
 
CiteScore and percentile 
Source: https://www.scopus.com/sourceid/27567?origin=sourceInfo&zone=refpointrank 
CiteScore 2015 counts the citations received in 2015 to documents published in 
2012, 2013 or 2014, and divides this by the number of documents published in 
2012, 2013 and 2014. 
 
Figure 13: RSER is ranked in the 96th percentile of Renewable Energy, Sustainability and the 
Environment according to CiteScore, being ranked #5 out of 117 journals. 
 
Citations received 
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The first paper was published in September 2016 and has already received the 
following two citations:  
 
Figure 14: Citations received on Part 1 of this doctoral thesis  
 
 
Figure 15: First citation received, published in RSER in November 2016  
GMB Doctoral Thesis   130/130 
 
Figure 16: Second citation received, to be published in Renewable Energy in August 2017  
 
 
